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I.

INTRODUCTION

An explosion of capitalistic innovation has profoundly impacted the
modern investment landscape. 1 This increase in entrepreneurial activity
has precipitated a corresponding increase in the demand for capital both for
starting new business ventures and for managing a pre-existing company’s
operational needs for capital. 2 As a result, capital formation, as defined as
a company’s ability to effectively and efficiently raise capital for various
needs at different junctures in its life, will undoubtedly remain an integral
economic process. Fortuitously, this increased demand for capital has been
matched by an increase in modernized capital-financing alternatives. For
example, companies may be able to access the trillion dollar equity or debt
markets, such as the Rule 144A markets. 3 Similarly, these companies may
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1. See Steven Dresner, Introduction to PIPES: A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN
PUBLIC EQUITY 4 (Steven Dresner & E. Kurt Kim eds., rev. & updated ed. 2006) (“Changing
market dynamics will forever impact the capital requirements of issuers and the risk/return
tolerances of investors. The need to bridge the two promotes continuous innovation in the
design of deals.”).
2. Id.; MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW § 3.01 (4th ed. 2007).
3. See Scott J. Gelbard, Institutional Private Placements and Other Financing
Alternatives, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 532 (1997) (“Rule 144A provides a safe harbor
exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, for
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seek to tap into alternative pools of capital by conducting registered public
offerings or by employing various other mechanisms that, if effectively
utilized, provide them with financing for their various needs. 4
While the recent increase in the array of financing options available
for enterprises paints an optimistic picture for a company seeking capital,
several realities diminish a wholesale acceptance of this proposition. First,
market dynamics can often adversely impact a company’s ability to raise
capital. 5 To illustrate, a recent comprehensive assessment of U.S. markets
indicates that these markets are experiencing a significant decline in
competitiveness. 6 This deterioration may effectively depress economic
activity, reducing the willingness of financial institutions to undertake the
requisite funding and otherwise severely impeding capital formation
optimization. 7 As a consequence of these recent market developments,
companies are increasingly in search of innovative solutions to their

resale of unregistered securities to Qualified Institutional Buyers (‘QIBS’).”); Stephen M.
Graham, Financing Alternatives for Public Companies, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE
CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 111–116 (2006) (describing the
general structure of Rule 144A debt offerings); see also Sagient Research,
http://www.sagientresearch.com/pt/Gstats.cfm?Type=2 (last visited Oct. 21, 2008)
(recognizing 117 deals transacted under Rule 144A exemptions totaling $52,321,981,500, in
2007).
4. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, GOING PUBLIC HANDBOOK § 2:78
(2007) (stating that private placement and offshore offerings are common alternatives to
financing in the securities market); Gabriel Nahoum, Note, Small Cap Companies and the
Diamond In the Rough Theory: Dispelling the IPO Myth and Following the Regulation A
and Reverse Merger Examples, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1865, 1898-1908 (2007) (discussing
the pros and cons of regulation A exemptions and reverse mergers as alternatives to
registered public offerings).
See generally RICHARD A. BOOTH, FINANCING THE
CORPORATION § 1:8 (2008) (discussing sources of capital for established businesses).
5. COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE
U.S.
PUBLIC
EQUITY
MARKET
32
(2007),
available
at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/The_Competitive_Position_of_the_US_Public_Equity_Ma
rket.pdf (“By almost any meaningful measure, the competitive ness of the U.S. public equity
market has significantly deteriorated in recent years. From 2006 to 2007, most measures
[assessing the U.S. markets] either continued to decline or failed to substantially improve.”);
see also id. (noting that continuation of this trend will likely have a significant negative
impact on the activity of U.S. capital markets, including the formation and efficient
allocation of capital).
6. Id. (noting that the decline in the competitiveness of the U.S. private equity markets
has a negative impact on the U.S. economy in aggregate and is “continuing amid
challenging market conditions worldwide and growing concern about U.S. economic
fundamentals”).
7. Id. This deterioration is compounded by other regulatory developments that also
have arguably impeded effective capital formation. See also Task Force on Hedge Funds,
Report on Section 3(C)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Proposals to Create
an Exception for Qualified Purchasers, 51 BUS. LAW. 773, 791 (1996) (calling for a
reexamination of the rationale of Section 3(c)(1) due to its impediment on investment
vehicles, and thus, on capital formation).
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financing needs. 8 More than ever, affected companies aggressively seek
financing options that offer the dual objectives of versatility and efficiency.
One recent financing alternative that is steadily gaining recognition as
a viable capital formation mechanism is a “private investment” in public
equity, or PIPE. 9 To a large degree, PIPEs are increasingly viewed as an
economical and efficient means for a publicly-traded company to procure
capital funding. This level of approbation in the United States is due in
part to the legal and regulatory U.S. framework that enables these
transactions to be consummated with relative ease. 10 PIPEs are particularly
important in the contemporary financing environment as current market
conditions preclude many companies from accessing traditional public and
private sources of financing. 11
From a transactional perspective, PIPEs are privately issued equity or
equity-linked securities that are normally sold to “accredited investors” 12
8. See Mihkel E. Voore & Leela Hemmings, Evolution of the Unallocated Shelf
FIN.
2
(2003),
available
at
Prospectus,
CORP.
http://www.stikeman.com/newslett/CorpFinancing04.pdf (“Securities regulators in the
United States and Canada have been called upon increasingly in recent years to demonstrate
flexibility in the face of market realities and competitive challenges and to be sensitive to
the proposition that the speed and efficiency with which issuers can gain access to capital
markets directly affects their success.”); see also Laura Mueller, The Big Squeeze, AIRLINE
BUS., Feb. 2008, at 48 (“[U]ncertain market conditions could result in fewer capital market
financings, as the costs of these deals have risen relative to the economic benefits realized
by their issuers.”).
9. See Dresner, supra note 1, at 1 (“The use of PIPEs as a means to raise capital
continues to grow as those in the financial markets and managers of public companies gain
increasing access to information on the topic of private investments in public equity.”).
10. See Barbara A. Jones et al., Structuring PIPE Transactions in Key European
Jurisdictions, 37 INT’L L. 23, 23 (2003) (“PIPE transactions have not enjoyed the same level
of popularity in Europe as in the United States, in large part because the legal and regulatory
framework in many European jurisdictions hinder the ease with which such transactions can
be completed”).
11. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; see also Richard E. Gormley,
Overview: An Emerging Market, in PIPES: A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC
EQUITY, supra note 1, at 10 (“PIPEs . . . provide an alternative financing vehicle for public
companies in circumstances in which a public follow-on equity or equity-linked offering is
not desirable, advisable, or possible.”). See generally Graham, supra note 3, at 79
(discussing how it is increasingly more common for public companies in need of capital to
choose alternative sources of funding other than traditional public offerings).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2008) (defining an “accredited investor [as] any person
who comes within any of the following categories, or who the issuer reasonably believes
comes within any of the following categories . . . at the time of the sale of the securities to
that person”:
1) Any bank as defined in Section 3(a)(2) of the Act, or any savings and loan
association or other institution as defined in Section 3(a)(5)(A) of the Act,
whether such bank, savings and loan association, or other institution is acting in
its individual or fiduciary capacity;
2) Any broker or dealer registered under the Exchange Act and purchasing for
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by public companies in a hybrid transaction typically involving a
Regulation D private placement 13 followed by a registered public
its own account;
3) Any insurance company as defined in Section 2(a)(13) of the Securities Act;
4) Any registered investment company or business development company;
5) Any licensed small business investment company;
6) Any plan established and maintained by a state, its political subdivisions, or
any agency or instrumentality of a state or its political subdivisions, for the
benefit of its employees, if such plan has total assets in excess of $5 million;
7) Any employee benefit plan within the meaning of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) if (i) the investment decision is made by
a plan fiduciary, which is either a bank, savings and loan association, insurance
company, or registered investment adviser; or (ii) the employee benefit plan has
total assets in excess of $5 million; or (iii) the plan is a self-directed plan, with
investment decisions made solely by persons who are accredited investors;
8) Any private business development company as defined in Section 202(a)(22)
of the Advisers Act;
9) Any Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) exempt organization,
corporation, limited liability company, Massachusetts or similar business trust,
or partnership—with total assets in excess of $5 million not formed for the
specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered;
10) Any director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the
securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive officer, or general
partner of a general partner of that issuer;
11) Any natural person whose (i) individual net worth, or joint net worth with
that person’s spouse, at the time of the purchase exceeds $1 million, or (ii)
income or joint income with that person’s spouse exceeds $200,000 or
$300,000, respectively, in each of the two most recent years, and who has a
reasonable expectation of reaching that same income level in the current year;
12) Any trust with total assets exceeding $5 million not formed for the specific
purpose of acquiring the securities offered, and whose purchases are directed by
a sophisticated person; and
13) Any entity in which all equity owners are accredited investors.)
See also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(51)(a) (defining “qualified purchaser” as stated in the 1940
Investment Company Act); Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D,
Securities Act Release No. 33-8828, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,116 (Aug. 10, 2007) (explaining the
SEC’s proposal to add a new class of individual accredited investors—namely those
individuals who have at least $750,000 in investments).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. Rule 506 of Regulation D is the provision normally invoked
in this context. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1933) (stating that offerings conducted pursuant to
Rule 506 are state-preempted with respect to the exemption and registration mandates). See
generally Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Under State Blue Sky Laws—Federal
Preemption—Rule 506 Offerings, 10 INT’L CAP. MARKETS & SEC. REG. § 10:37 (2003)
(discussing preemption provisions added by The National Securities Markets Improvement
Act of 1996 (NSMIA), the most significant of which includes a rule adopted under Section
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offering. 14 PIPE issuers range in size from small, over-the-counter
(“OTC”) bulletin board companies to large-cap, NYSE-traded companies. 15
In terms of transaction frequency, PIPEs have dramatically increased from
the 306 transactions recorded in 1996 to the 1,454 deals that were closed in
2007. 16 The aggregate PIPE deal value during this same period also has
grown from just over $4 billion dollars to a whopping $83 billion dollars—
a staggering increase. 17
Although once considered a financing alternative of last resort used
mainly by cash-strapped companies or issuers otherwise unable to secure
traditional sources of capital, 18 the PIPE market now attracts sophisticated
market players. 19 Several factors are responsible for PIPE’s emergence as
a viable capital-raising alternative. Regulatory changes, the increasing
difficulty of accessing so-called traditional capital sources previously
alluded to, and entrepreneurial ingenuity have all contributed to PIPE’s
4(2) of the Securities Act, which includes Rule 506, but not Rule 505 and 504 offerings).
14. See Dresner, supra note 1, at 1.
15. See Gormley, supra note 11, at 19 (“The PIPE/RD issuer universe is populated by
small-cap and mid-cap growth companies, although an increasing number of companies
with larger market capitalizations and/or in traditional industries have begun to utilize these
financing formats”); see also Steve Winters, MANAGING RISK: SECURITIES STRUCTURES,
TRADING AND DEAL DOCUMENTATION, IN PIPES: A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN
PUBLIC EQUITY, 205 (rev. and updated ed. 2006) (“PIPEs have continued to attract an
extremely diverse group of professional investors, ranging from Warren Buffett’s Berkshire
Hathaway to traditional mutual fund investors and numerous hedge funds pursuing an
arbitrage or deep value investment platform”).
16. Sagient Research, http://www.sagientresearch.com/pt/GStats.cfm?Type=6 (last
visited Oct. 21, 2008); see also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., PIPEs, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS.
L.J. 381, 382 (2007) (noting that PIPEs have become an important source of financing for
many small public companies).
17. Sagient Research, supra note 16 (indicating an $83 billion aggregate PIPE deal
value in 2007—a $55 billion jump from the $29 billion aggregate in 2006); see also
Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 382 (noting that the success enjoyed by hedge funds in investing
in PIPEs has been so great that in the last two years, the SEC has brought a number of
enforcement actions against the hedge funds accusing them of insider trading and violations
of the registration requirements of the Securities Act in connection with PIPE investments).
18. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 381-82 (finding that “[w]hile companies of all sizes
have used PIPEs to raise money, PIPE deals have emerged as a vital financing source for
small public companies.”); see id. at 382 (observing that the PIPE deals completed in 2006
were generally executed by companies with market capitalizations of $250 million or less
and that these statistics are often attributable to the “reality that PIPEs represent the only
available financing option for many small public companies”); Susan Chaplinsky & David
Haushalter, Financing Under Extreme Uncertainty: Contract Terms and Returns to Private
Investments in Public Equity 2 (May 2006) (unpublished article), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=907676 (stating that firms that face difficulty raising capital
through traditional financing instruments often use PIPEs).
19. See Dresner, supra note 1, at 27 (“The PIPE marketplace has been utterly
transformed during the past decade from a fledging cottage industry into a dynamic and
robust sector of the corporate finance landscape.”); see also WINTERS, supra note 15, at 205206 (commenting on the diverse group of professional investors that PIPEs attract).
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rising popularity. 20
Despite this rising popularity, scant comprehensive coverage has been
given to PIPEs and their role in the overall capital formation landscape,
particularly in light of recent significant regulatory developments. The
purpose of this article is to highlight PIPEs as an alternative financing
technique, in light of recent changes in the regulatory framework within
which PIPEs and similar financing transactions are executed. To this end,
Part II sets the stage for a comprehensive discussion of PIPEs by providing
an overview of the traditional financing sources typically available to
companies. Part III then provides a substantive evaluation of PIPEs and
covers topics including the definition of a PIPE, the PIPE market, and the
investment benefits generally attributed to PIPEs. Part IV continues the
discussion of PIPEs and focuses primarily on the recent regulatory
developments that have positioned PIPEs ideally in the capital formation
arena. Part V asserts that, on balance, PIPEs deservedly have emerged as a
viable capital formation alternative, concluding that, given the uncertainty
engendered by recent regulatory developments, both issuers and investors
must proceed with PIPE transactions in a strategic manner.
II.

OVERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL CAPITAL FORMATION OPTIONS

This section provides an overview of the traditional capital financing
alternatives and focuses primarily on registered public offerings and private
placements. While there are a plethora of ways to finance transactional
structures, both conventional and exotic, these options generally involve
either a public offering, a private placement or a combination thereof. As
such, this section’s analysis focuses on the public offering and private
transactional exemptions. 21
A.

Registered Public Offerings

Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”) is the
foundation of the federal securities law regulatory framework as it pertains
20. See, e.g., Marine Cole, Debt Strain Unclogs PIPEs: Bank of America’s $2 billion
investment in Countrywide marks the return of private investments in public equity, FIN.
WEEK, Sep. 10, 2007, http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070910
/REG/70907014/1005/TOC (noting that some companies, especially mortgage-related and
small-cap companies, have turned to PIPEs because access to bank loans has become
difficult in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis).
21. For a comprehensive discussion of the various financing alternatives available, see
Abigail Arms, The Private Placement Alternative to a Public Offering, in PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 135 (2004) (providing
an overview of the private offering and resale exemptions available to issuers and investors
under the Securities Act of 1933).
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to registered public offerings. Pursuant to section 5, it is unlawful for any
person to sell securities unless a registration statement, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), is effective. 22 In
addition to setting forth the basic registration requirement, section 5 also
articulates the prospectus delivery rules which state that a final statutory
prospectus compliant with Section 10(a) of the 1933 Act must be accessible
or delivered to the investor at or prior to the sale of a registered security. 23
While the registration requirement creates a formidable regulatory
paradigm in the context of public offerings, there are several exemptions to
this requirement that, if effectively perfected, allow an issuer to sell
securities absent the filing of a registration statement. 24 These exemptions
are discussed more fully later in this section of the article. Note, moreover,
that irrespective of the Securities Act registration regimen, market
conditions, costs of undertaking a public offering, and competitive
challenges to induce reputable investment banks to underwrite a public
offering pose significant hurdles for an unseasoned or financially troubled
issuer to successfully effectuate a public offering. 25
Under the 1933 Act and the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, a subject issuer has certain options, depending on its unique
circumstances and overall profile, to undertake a registered public offering.
These options may be principally distinguished by the disclosure
requirements that are applicable to each of them and the manner in which
those disclosure requirements can be satisfied. 26 The predominant
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006). This discussion simplifies the cumbersome registration
requirements. The SEC significantly revised and deregulated these mandates in 2005. See
Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug.
3, 2005) (adopting new rules to “eliminate unnecessary and outmoded restrictions on
offerings”); MARC. I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 4.01-4.02 (5th ed. 2008)
(providing discussion and materials on the registration process); Joseph F. Morrissey,
Rhetoric and Reality: Investor Protection and the Securities Regulation Reform of 2005, 56
CATH. U. L. REV. 561, 563–65 (2007) (providing an analysis of the 2005 revisions).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b), (c) (2006); Securities Act Release No. 8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at
44,722. As part of the 2005 offering reform, the SEC eliminated prior Rule 434 and
adopted a more flexible access-as-delivery approach in Rule 172. See Securities Act, 17
C.F.R. § 230.172 (2005) (creating exemptions to prospectus requirement).
24. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2006) (providing an exemption for private
offerings irrespective of the monetary amount raised); see also STEINBERG, supra note 2, at
101 (“To protect investors and the integrity of the securities markets, the Securities Act of
1933 (Securities Act or 1933 Act) has two basic objectives: (1) to provide investors with
adequate and accurate material information concerning securities offered for sale and (2) to
prohibit fraudulent practices in the offer or sale of securities”).
25. See STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 39, 122-25.
26. DAVID A. CIFRINO & THOMAS P. CONAGHAN, THE PUBLIC COMPANY PRIMER: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO GOING PUBLIC, RAISING CAPITAL AND LIFE AS A PUBLIC COMPANY 4748 (2007), available at http://financial.rrd.com/wwwFinancial/Downloads/PDF/
RR%20Donnelley%20Public%20Company%20Primer.pdf (generally describing the various
registration options available to a company seeking to conduct a registered public offering).
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registration forms available to issuers are Form S-1 and Form S-3. 27
1.

Registration Forms
a.

Form S-1

Form S-1 is the basic form available to an issuer who wishes to “go
public” 28 (or is otherwise ineligible to use a more simplified form) to
register any of its equity or debt securities to be sold in a public offering. 29
Form S-1 is considered a general purpose form used for the registration of
securities under the 1933 Act and is typically available to all issuing
companies that are not eligible or required to use a different form. 30 The
informational requirements that must be narratively set forth in a Form S-1
are the most expansive of all the available registration forms. 31 These
heightened disclosure obligations are, in large part, attributable to the fact
that Form S-1 is the registration form that new entrants into the registered
offering arena are required to use. 32 Until an issuer becomes eligible to use
27. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (2007) (describing SEC Form S-3); Revisions to the
Eligibility Requirements for Primary Securities Offerings on Forms S-3 and F-3, Securities
Act Release No. 33-8878, 72 Fed. Reg. 73,534 (Dec. 27, 2007) (describing revisions to
Forms S-1 and S-3).
28. “Going public” is the process by which a privately-held issuer becomes publiclyheld under the federal securities laws. Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, 3A
SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 8:1 (2d ed. 2007); STEINBERG, supra note 2, at
§§ 3.01, 4.01; see also Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public, in 2 VENTURE CAPITAL AND
SMALL BUSINESS FINANCINGS §§ 12:1, 12:22 (Robert Haft ed., 2008) (discussing the
attendant costs of going public); Johnathan A. Koff & Michael Lee, The Initial Public
Offering Process, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 114-16 (1997) (discussing the disadvantages associated with “going
public,” including the increased risk of liability for directors under federal securities law).
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2006) (creating Form S-1, to be used for “securities of all
registrants for which no other form is authorized or prescribed”).
30. See Revisions to the Eligibility Requirements for Primary Securities Offerings on
Forms S-3 and F-3, Securities Act Release No. 33-8878, 72 Fed. Reg. at 73,539 (“[A]n
issuer that is temporarily prevented from utilizing Form S-3 for shelf offerings to raise
capital would not be foreclosed from registering a primary offering of securities on Form S1 or in private placements.”).
31. The informational requirements of SEC Form S-1 are contained in items 3-17. 17
C.F.R. § 239.11. Note also that the informational disclosure requirements for both the
prospectus and subsequent portions of the Form S-1 registration statement are articulated by
reference to the comprehensive disclosure requirements set forth in Regulation S-K and
Regulation S-X. See BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 28, at § 5:40 (describing the
requirements for disclosure under Regulation S-K); see also 1B HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL
& SAMUEL WOLFF, 1B GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION § 12:30 (2007)
(discussing the contents of the prospectus, i.e., the basic information package as well as the
extensive in-depth information required by Form S-1 as contrasted with Form S-3).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11. Form S-1 is divided into two primary categories: (i) Part I,
which articulates the information required to be disclosed in the prospectus and (ii) Part II,
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a different form, such as Form S-3, it is restricted to the use of Form S-1
for all offerings, even those made subsequent to the initial public offering
(“IPO”). 33 Not surprisingly, due to the detailed disclosure that must be set
forth if a subject issuer may not incorporate by reference 34 and the fact that
compliance with such disclosure mandates may impede a company’s ability
to quickly access capital markets, 35 Form S-1 is disfavored, particularly in
the shelf offering context. 36

which provides the information that must be included in the registration statement, but is not
expressly required to be included in the prospectus. Id. Note, however, that Form S-1 does
not actually enumerate the informational disclosures for both the prospectus and the rest of
the registration statement. Rather, Form S-1 contains references to more particularized
disclosure requirements articulated by Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X. Id. See
generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 229 (dealing with the application of Regulation S-K and S-X).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11. Pursuant to the Form S-3 instructions in effect up until
recently, a company that wished to use Form S-3 was required to have a class of securities
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and to have timely made all filings
required under the Exchange Act for at least the twelve months preceding the filing of the
registration statement. In addition, the company was required to satisfy one of the form’s
transactional requirements, depending on the type of offering to be conducted. For example,
in order to conduct a primary offering, a company was required to have a non-affiliate
equity market capitalization, or “public float,” of at least $75 million. While the recent
amendments to Form S-3 left many of these requirements in place, new General Instruction
I.B.6 to Form S-3 expands the universe of potentially eligible users by providing certain
situations in which companies with a public float of less than $75 million are allowed to
register primary offerings on Form S-3 provided that certain requirements are satisfied. Id.;
see also infra notes 163-199 and accompanying text (providing a more comprehensive
discussion of the recent Form S-3 amendments).
34. While issuers have historically been prohibited from incorporating by reference
when relying on Form S-1, pursuant to the 2005 Offering Rule Reform, this Form now
permits certain issuers to incorporate by reference from Exchange Act periodic reports (such
as Forms 8-K, 10-K, and 10-Q). See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 394 n.90 (stating that
allowing certain issuers to incorporate by reference from Exchange Act periodic reports has
not significantly impacted PIPE issuers relying on Form S-1 because many were a blank
check company, a shell company or a registered penny stock offering—entity types that are
restricted from relying on the limited incorporation by reference available with the Form S1); see also 17 C.F.R. § 239.11, Form S-1, General Instruction VII.
35. See Revisions to the Eligibility Requirements for Primary Securities Offerings on
Forms S-3 and F-3, Securities Act Release No. 33-8878, 72 Fed. Reg. at 247 (stating that
the use of Form S-3 “allow[s] companies to avoid additional delays and interruptions in the
offering process and can reduce or even eliminate the costs associated with preparing and
filing post-effective amendments to the registration statement”).
36. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2006). For example, the automatic update
feature that is available in the context of Form S-3 is not available to users of Form S-1.
Consequently, such issuers using Form S-1 must manually update the shelf registration by
filing supplements and or amendments with the SEC to incorporate information contained in
the subject issuer’s periodic 1934 Exchange Act (the “1934 Act”) filings. See also
Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 394 (noting that the use of Form S-1 is likely to result in higher
transaction costs for issuers given that these forms require more comprehensive disclosures,
involve a longer preparation period, and often result in investors demanding higher
discounts for compensation due to the longer period of illiquidity that the foregoing factors
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Form S-3

Due to the availability of incorporation by reference from Exchange
Act periodic reports into the registration statement, Form S-3 is typically
the favored registration form. 37 Thus, a significant advantage that Form S3 provides is that it permits securities to be offered pursuant to a
registration statement setting forth only a limited amount of information,
such as a description of the plan of distribution and the securities being
offered, while much of the information is incorporated by reference from
the issuing company’s periodic filings made pursuant to the Exchange Act
reporting framework. 38 As a consequence, Form S-3 constitutes a more
versatile option, especially with respect to an issuer’s ability to take
advantage of shelf registration. 39
create).
37. See Sjorstrom, supra note 16, at 393 (generally describing the benefits associated
with Form S-3); infra notes 163-199 and accompanying text (discussing recent amendments
to Form S-3 eligibility requirements).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (2006), SEC Form S-3. Of course, material facts that occurred
after the filing of the most recent Exchange Act report must be disclosed in Form S-3. See
Robert J. Haft & Peter M. Fass, 4 TAX-ADVANTAGED SECURITIES § 6:134 (2008) (stating
that disclosure must be made in “quarterly updates to the risk factors disclosure to reflect
any material changes from risks previously disclosed in Exchange Act reports”); see also
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, 1B GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION, supra note 31,
at § 12:19.
39. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (describing the conditions under which an
offering and sale of securities may be delayed or continued). In this context, “shelf
registration” is a term used for Securities Act registration pursuant to SEC Rule 415 in
which an issuer essentially places the offering on the shelf, enabling such issuer to access
the securities markets quickly when conditions become favorable. In at-the-market primary
offerings, shelf registration is available to issuers capable of using a Form S-3. Issuers
generally prefer using a shelf registration because of the advantages it offers, including a 3year expiration date, favorable renewal options, elimination of limits for at-the-market
equity offerings, automatic shelf registrations for well known seasoned issuers (WKSIs)
(immediate effectiveness of registration statements) and a “pay as you go” filing system. A
disadvantage inherent in shelf offerings is that each new prospectus supplement filed
extends the statute of limitations for possible Section 11 liability. In sum, shelf offerings
provide a convenient and efficient way for an issuer to quickly register stock and sell the
subject securities in the open market. See Securities Act Release No. 33-8878, supra note
30.
While the foregoing forms, particularly Form S-3, normally are the preferred and
predominant registration forms, they are not the only registration options. In particular, both
Form S-4 and Form S-8 are specialized registration forms used in specific transactional
scenarios. For example, Form S-4 is the registration forms used when registering securities
that will be exchanged in a context involving an acquisition or similar business combination
(e.g., mergers, consolidations, and similar transactions). As such, issuances of stock to the
target company’s shareholders in such acquisitions are generally registered on Form S-4.
Form S-4, like Form S-3, permits the issuer to incorporate information about itself by
reference to its periodic Exchange Act filings, assuming the issuer is eligible under
applicable Form S-3 requirements. Similarly, Form S-8 is a specialized registration form
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Registration Exemptions

While the foregoing discussion focused on registered public offerings,
there are several exemptions from Securities Act registration. Depending
on the circumstances, invocation of a particular exemption may enable an
issuer to raise the requisite capital while avoiding the costs generally
attributable to public offerings. 40 Absent an exemption, all sales of
securities must be registered pursuant to Section 5 of the Securities Act. 41
Moreover, unless the applicable state regulatory system for the sale of
securities is preempted by federal law (such as pursuant to the 1996
National Securities Market Improvement Act 42 ) or an applicable state law
offering exemption is met, the subject security generally must be registered
in each state in which the issuer offers to sell the security. 43 However,
that allows public companies that file regular reports under the 1934 Act to register
securities that are issued pursuant to employment-related stock awards and option plans.
Essentially, Form S-8 enables Exchange Act reporting companies to issue shares to
employees and consultants without having to comply with the more cumbersome
registration Form S-1 or otherwise to perfect an exemption from Securities Act registration.
In addition, Form S-8 also enables non-affiliate employees who receive these shares to resell
such shares without having to comply with applicable resale limitations. 17 C.F.R. §
239.16(b), SEC Form S-8 (2006). See ROBERT J. WILD, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE SERIES:
DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITIES COMPLIANCE PROGRAM § 1:14 (2007) (“Form S-4 [is]
used for securities to be issued as a result of a business combination or in an exchange offer
such as those involving debt securities issued in a Rule 144A offering”); see also HR Series
Comp. and Benefits § 10:69 (2nd Ed. 2008) (stating that Form S-8 was designed specifically
for use in connection with non-statutory stock option plans implemented by employers).
40. See STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 38-39 (stating with respect to the preparation of the
public offering registration statement, “[t]he disclosures required are detailed and complex,
the document’s length is massive, and the costs of preparing the registration statement,
including accountant, attorney, investment banker and printer fees, easily can run into the
tens if not hundreds of thousands of dollars.” In light of the foregoing factors, “the costs of
having a “registered” offering under the Securities Act frequently will be substantial.”).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006). The issuer bears the burden of proving that an
exemption applies. S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953). Certain
securities, such as municipal bonds, are exempt from Securities Act registration. See David
J. Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities and
Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L REV. 1599, 1629 (1986) (explaining that the Securities Act
establishes a number of exemptions from securities registrations including, “‘exempt
securities,’ principally comprised of United States government securities and municipal
bonds, [which] need not be registered”).
42. National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3443 (1996) (“The Commission, by rule, may exempt any sale of
securities . . . from any fee imposed by this section, if the Commission finds that such
exemption is consistent with the public interest, the equal regulation of markets and brokers
and dealers, and the development of a national market system.”).
43. See STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 132 (“With certain exceptions and subject to the
preemptive provisions of the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, unless
an exemption from state registration is perfected, any offer or sale within a particular state
must be registered.”).
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irrespective of the availability of an exemption from registration, the
antifraud provisions of both federal and state securities laws apply. 44 The
following discussion briefly highlights issuer exemptions to the Section 5
registration requirement that have particular relevance in the PIPE context.
1.

Section 4(2) Exemption

The Section 4(2) exemption specifically provides that all “transactions
by an issuer not involving a public offering,” are not subject to the Section
5 registration requirement. 45 The congressional intent underlying the
Section 4(2) exemption is to exempt sales where there is no realistic need
for such application or where the overall benefits are too remote. 46 While
the Section 4(2) exemption historically has been viewed as the key
statutory private placement exemption available to issuers, 47 its practical
functioning is at times thwarted because the statute does not provide
sufficient guidance with respect to its application. 48 As a result, issuers
may be placed in the precarious position of ascertaining compliance with
Section 4(2)’s terms from judicial and administrative interpretations that, at
times, are ambiguous, at best.
The most relied upon judicial interpretation of the Section 4(2)
exemption is the United States Supreme Court’s decision in SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co. 49 In that case, the Supreme Court made clear that the critical
inquiry, with respect to the applicability of the Section 4(2) exemption, is
whether the offerees are able to fend for themselves so as to render the
registration mandate unnecessary. Key determinants in this inquiry are the
financial sophistication of each offeree and whether each offeree was
provided with, or had access to, the kind of information that is contained in
a registration statement. 50 Ralston Purina and subsequent lower court

44. See STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 95 (noting that regardless of whether a
transactional exemption is properly perfected pursuant to the applicable rules and
guidelines, an issuing company will nonetheless be required to comply with antifraud
restrictions imposed by a myriad of securities laws, namely the 1934 Act). The Rule 506
exemption is not within state regulation due to NSMIA preemption. See § 18(b)(4) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (describing certain exempt offerings).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006).
46. See H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933) (providing Congressional
analysis of the Securities Act at the time of passage); see also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,
346 U.S. 119 (1953) (examining congressional intent underlying the § 4(2) exemption).
47. See Carl W. Schneider, Section 4(1-½)—Private Resales of Restricted or Controlled
Securities, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 503 (1988) (stating that § 4(2) “is the general exemption
for so-called ‘private placements’”).
48. See Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, 31
BUS. LAW. 485, 485 (1975) (noting uncertainty in application of § 4(2)).
49. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
50. Id. at 126-27; Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977).
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decisions examine several factors in order to determine Section 4(2)’s
applicability in purportedly private transactions:
the number of offerees and their relationships to each other and to
the issuer;
the manner of the offering;
the sophistication and expertise of the offerees;
the nature and type of information provided to offerees either
directly or indirectly (i.e., by giving access); and
the precautions employed by the issuer to prevent the resale of
the underlying securities. 51
Application of the Section 4(2) criteria may result in lack of certainty,
an especially troublesome consequence for market participants desiring
successful consummation of “transactions.” 52 Consequently, Rule 506 of
Regulation D (“Reg D”), with its comparative certainty of application, is
the modern-day exemption of choice, particularly in the PIPE setting. 53
2.

Rule 506 – Section 4(2) Safe Harbor

As a result of the commercial uncertainty created by the Section 4(2)
exemption, the SEC promulgated Rule 506 of Reg D. 54 To place the
importance of Rule 506 in its proper context in the PIPE setting, a review
of this regulation is in order.
The first three rules of Reg D consist of general rules that apply to the
Rule 506 exemption. 55 For example, Rule 501 is a definitional section that
provides the meaning of several key terms used throughout Reg D. 56 A
significant definition contained in Rule 501 is the definition of an
“accredited investor,” which the rule defines as any person who comes

51. E.g., Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978); Doran, 545 F.2d at 893.
The size of the offering and the number of securities offered were considered relevant at
some point but evidently no longer. See STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 105.
52. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 391 (noting that the application of Section 4(2) is
complicated by the fact that neither the 1933 Act nor any of the rules promulgated
thereunder actually defines “public offering”).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2006). Other exemptions contained in Reg D include Rule
504 and Rule 505. See HR Series Compensation and Benefits, 2 COMP. AND BENEFITS,
supra note 39, at § 10:92 (2008) (outlining the Regulation D exemptions available under
Rules 504, 505, and 506).
54. See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving
Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 24 SEC Docket 1166 (March
8, 1982) (attempting to simplify and classify exemptions and to “achieve uniformity
between federal and state exemptions”).
55. These rules also apply, depending on the circumstances, to other Reg. D
exemptions. For example, the definition of “accredited investor” applies to both Rule 505
and Rule 506. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 230.505, 230.506.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2006).
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within one of several specifically enumerated categories at the time of the
offering. 57
Similarly, Rule 502 contains important rules concerning integration,
information requirements, and manner of offering limitations. 58 First, Rule
502 contains a significant provision concerning the integration of
offerings. 59 Integration is the principle by which two or more offerings that
are supposedly distinct and structured as separate may be “integrated,” or
regarded by the SEC as one combined offering for which an exemption
may not be available. 60 The regulatory policy underlying integration is
rather straightforward—it prevents an issuer and its promoters from
inappropriately circumventing the registration requirements imposed by
Section 5 of the 1933 Act by breaking a larger and possibly non-exempt
offering into smaller, seemingly exempt offerings. 61 Integration analysis is
particularly applicable to PIPE transactions since the fundamental structure
of these deals involves two offerings—a registered offering effected
subsequent to a private placement. As such, if these offerings were
integrated and construed as one larger offering, a Securities Act registration
violation would result. 62
There are generally two methods for determining if separate offerings
are subject to integration. First, if the two separate offerings are not
executed within six months of each other, Rule 502(a) provides a safe
harbor for Reg D offerings, thereby signifying that integration will not
occur. 63 Second, if offerings are made within six months of each other, a

57. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2006).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a).
60. See generally Theodore W. Jones, The Doctrine of Securities Act “Integration”, 29
SEC. REG. L.J. 320 (2001) (assessing the impact of basic Securities Act concepts on the
development of the integration framework in light of the evolution of domestic capital
markets); Daniel J. Morrissey, Integration of Securities Offerings—The ABA’s “Indiscrete”
Proposal, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 41 (1984) (discussing the need for nuanced integration criteria to
safeguard the registration process); Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Integration of Securities
Offerings: Obstacles to Capital Formation Remain for Small Businesses, 45 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 935 (1988) (examining several approaches to reforming the integration doctrine).
61. See, e.g., Donohoe v. Consol. Operating & Prod. Corp., 982 F.2d 1130, 1140 (7th
Cir. 1992) (describing the purpose of the integration doctrine and giving deference to SEC
interpretations of it); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding
integration where the defendant-appellant had offered shares of limited partnerships at
different times, but for the same purpose, under a single financing plan, and in return the
same type of consideration).
62. Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 395.
63. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b)(2) (2006) (creating a sixmonth safe harbor from integration for intrastate offerings). But see Securities Act Release
No. 33-8828, supra note 12 (proposing to decrease this safe harbor from six months to 90
days).
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five-factor balancing test applies. 64 These factors are whether the
offerings: (i) are part of a single plan of financing; (ii) involve the issuance
of the same class of securities; (iii) were made about the same time; (iv)
involve the same type of consideration; and (v) are made for the same
general purposes. 65 When offerings transpire within the safe harbor time
periods, thereby mandating application of this five-factor test, the ad hoc
nature of the test along with inconsistent judicial interpretation has resulted
While the potential consequences of
in commercial uncertainty. 66
integration can be catastrophic, PIPE issuers generally are able to avert this
According to Rule 152 and SEC
risk by invoking Rule 152. 67
interpretations thereunder, 68 offerings made prior to a registration
statement’s filing and conducted under circumstances not mandating
registration, do not by the fact of registration become the sort of offerings
which are proscribed by the Securities Act. 69
64. Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 27 Fed. Reg.
11,316, 11,317 (Nov. 16, 1962).
65. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a); see also Jones, supra note 60, at 323-25 (explaining the
five-factor test); Wallace, supra note 60, at 939-42 (identifying confusion surrounding the
five-factor test).
66. See Leib M. Lerner, Disclosing Toxic PIPEs: Why the SEC Can and Should
Expand the Reporting Requirements Surrounding Private Investments in Public Equities 58
BUS. LAW. 655, 675 (2003) (noting that since the SEC has stated that any of the factors can
be determinative in the promulgation of the five-factor test, uncertainty is created for issuers
over whether their offerings are subject to integration); see also Jones, supra note 60, at
325; Morrissey, supra note 60; Wallace, supra note 60, at 939-42 (all discussing aspects of
the uncertainty created by application of the five-factor test).
67. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (2006).
68. Id. (“The phrase transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering used in
section 4(2) . . . shall be deemed to apply to transactions not involving any public offering at
the time of said transactions although subsequently thereto the issuer decides to make a
public offering and/or files a registration statement.”). As is evident from the SEC’s
approach to the application of Rule 152 in the context of PIPEs, the key analytical and
factual consideration in this context is determining when the first phase of a PIPE
transaction, typically the private offering, is complete. Pursuant to Rule 152’s safe harbor
and SEC interpretations thereof, a completed private offering component of a PIPE
transaction will not be integrated with the subsequent public secondary offering if the first
offering was properly “completed.” The SEC’s position is that a private placement of PIPE
shares is “completed” for purposes of satisfying Rule 152’s prerequisites if purchase
commitments are in place from all participating investors such that the only existing
contingencies are outside their control. See Black Box Incorporated, 1990 SEC No-Act.
Lexis 926; Squadron, Ellenoff, Pleasant & Leher, 1992 SEC No-Act. Lexis 363.
Essentially, these purchase commitments must unequivocally establish that there is no room
for any further investment decision on the part of participating investors.
69. See SEC DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, MANUAL OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS, at H (1997) [hereinafter SEC TELEPHONE MANUAL],
available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone.shtml (pointing out that the SEC
interpretations even go so far as to allow an issuer to file a resale registration statement prior
to the closing of the related private offering without the application of integration if: (i) the
private offering investors are “irrevocably bound to purchase a set number of securities of a
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Rule 502 also contains provisions that specify the manner in which
Rule 506 offerings must be conducted in order to be eligible for
exemption. 70
One such provision bans general solicitation and
advertising. 71 As interpreted by the SEC, a key criterion in determining
whether a subject communication complies with the general solicitation
and advertising bans is whether a pre-existing relationship existed with the
prospective purchasers. 72 A key basis underlying this criterion is that a
pre-existing relationship enables the subject issuer and its financial
intermediaries to assess investor suitability, namely, whether a prospective
investor aptly can evaluate the merits of a contemplated investment. 73 In
set purchase price that is not based on market price or a fluctuation ratio, either at the time
of effectiveness of the resale registration statement or at any subsequent date,” (ii) there are
no conditions to closing that are within an investor’s control or that an investor can cause
not to be satisfied,” and (iii) “[t]he closing of the private placement of the un-issued
securities must occur within a short time after the effectiveness of the resale registration
statement”); J.W. HICKS, LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTIONS: REGULATION D § 3:9 (20072008) (discussing Rule 152); Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 396-97 (generally discussing the
SEC Telephone Manual).
70. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(1), § 230.502(c) (2006). Similarly, Rule 502 also contains
rules that require issuers to provide specified information to investors targeted in Reg D
offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 502(b)(1) (2006). The applicability of Rule 502’s informational
mandate generally hinges on the type of offeree a particular issuer is targeting in the private
placement transaction. For example, if the issuer is targeting only accredited investors, as
defined by Rule 501, the issuer is not subject to Rule 502’s informational requirements.
Conversely, if the issuer is targeting non-accredited investors in addition to accredited
investors, the issuer is required to comply with Rule 502’s informational prescriptions.
Because Rule 506 transactions in the PIPE context normally are made solely to accredited
purchasers, no mandated information must be delivered to comply with the exemption. See
Dresner, supra note 1, at 65, 70.
71. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (“Neither the issuer nor any person acting on its behalf is
permitted to offer to sell securities by any form of general solicitation or general advertising,
including but not limited to (i) any advertisement, article, or other published or broad cast
communication; or (ii) any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited by
general solicitation of advertising”). Note that a violation of the general solicitation or
advertising ban is not subject to the substantial compliance defense of Rule 508. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.508 (2006).
72. Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 33-6455, 1983
WL 409415 (March 3, 1983).
73. See Mineral Lands Research and Marketing Corp., 1985 SEC No-Action Letter,
1985 WL 55694 (arguing that the “manner of offering by the Company does not constitute
general advertising or general solicitation because most of the offerees are a limited group
with whom an officer and director of the issuer has a pre-existing business relationship”).
More recently, the SEC has allowed issuers and financial intermediaries to demonstrate the
presence of a “pre-existing relationship” by having an investor fill out a generic
questionnaire about their investing habits in order to qualify them as accredited. This
questionnaire, followed by a cooling off period, establishes a pre-existing relationship. See
Lamp Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 278984 (May 29, 1998); Lamp
Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 282988 (May 29, 1997); H.B. Shaine
& Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 107907 (May 1, 1987); IPONET, SEC NoAction Letter, 1996 WL 431821 (July 26, 1996). As a result, today thousands of investors
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the PIPE offering context, the invocation of the pre-existing relationship
standard helps to ensure that the subject issuer can uphold the legality of
the offering if challenged on grounds of general solicitation. 74
3.

Rule 506

Turning to the primary exemption involved in many PIPE offerings,
Rule 506 of Regulation D 75 serves as a “safe harbor” to the Section 4(2)
can access an issuer’s website, become pre-qualified and accordingly participate in Reg. D
offerings without the issuer violating the general solicitation ban. See generally Katherine
Killingsworth, A History of General Solicitation Under the 1933 Act and Why Additional
Guidance is Needed for the Future, 33 SEC. REG. L.J. 47, 56-61 (2005) (discussing the
formation of new pre-existing relationships and the implications of those relationships for
the existence of a general solicitation); David B.H. Martin, Jr. & L. Keith Parsons, The
Preexisting Relationship Doctrine Under Regulation D: A Rule Without Reason?, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1031, 1040-46 (1988) (criticizing the use of the pre-existing
relationship test).
74. With respect to Rule 503, that rule provides that issuers relying on any Reg D
offering must provide the SEC with notice of such by filing a notice on Form D. An issuer
that violates this provision risks the penalty of disqualification from the ability to make
additional Reg D offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (2006). The SEC recently revised Form
D. See Securities Act Release No. 8891 (2008).
75. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2006). Note that other exemptions in Regulation D include
Rules 504 and 505. Rule 504 is one of two limited offering transactional exemptions
adopted by the SEC pursuant to its statutory authority under Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act.
Essentially, Rule 504 facilitates capital formation by smaller start-up companies and does so
by providing them with an exemption from the Section 5 registration mandate for offerings
not exceeding $1 million in any twelve month period. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2006). In
addition to the monetary limitation, the Rule 504 exemption may be used by issuers that are
not reporting companies, investment companies or blank check companies. Further, in a
Rule 504 exemption there are no limits on the number of investors that can participate,
investor qualification is not required, and under certain circumstances, restrictions on
general solicitation and resale are inapplicable. Under federal law, an issuer relying on the
Rule 504 exemption is not required to provide specific offering information to investors. In
practical effect, if a public Rule 504 offering is conducted, many states require the filing of a
state registration statement. See STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 57-58.
Rule 505 contains an exemption for offerings not exceeding $5 million in any 12-month
period by issuers to no more than thirty-five non-accredited investors and an unlimited
number of accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(a). Rule 505 investors are considered
accredited if they fall into one of the categories enumerated in Rule 501(a), and, unlike in
Rule 506 offerings, there is no requirement to qualify non-accredited investors as
sophisticated. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(1)-(2). Additionally, an issuer is not eligible to rely
on the Rule 505 offering if it is an investment company or otherwise disqualified according
to Rule 252. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii). Further, if a Rule 505 offering includes nonaccredited investors, the issuer is obligated to fully comply with Rules 501 and 502. As
with Rule 504, the Rule 508 substantial compliance defense is available to Rule 505 issuers
in certain circumstances. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a)(1)-(3) (2006). Note, however, that the
Rule 508 substantial compliance test is not available for violations of the ban on general
solicitation, the limitation on the number of non-accredited investors, or the limitation on
aggregate offering price. Id.; see also James R. Tanenbaum & Anna T. Pinedo, The Law:
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statutory exemption described above. 76 Accordingly, if an issuer satisfies
Rule 506’s requirements, the offering falls within the exemptive scope of
Section 4(2). However, unlike the Section 4(2) analysis, which focuses on
offerees, Rule 506 is generally focused on purchasers. 77 Pursuant to Rule
506, there can be no more than thirty-five non-accredited purchasers and an
unlimited number of accredited investors. 78 Further, while there is no
express limit on the number of offerees that can be targeted in Rule 506
transactions, marketing the offering to a large number of prospective
investors who have no pre-existing relationship with the issuer or financial
intermediaries may violate the ban on general solicitation and advertising. 79
Additionally, accredited investors participating in a Rule 506 offering are
irrefutably presumed to be financially sophisticated and to have access to
registration-type information. Accordingly, Rule 506 does not require
delivery of information to accredited purchasers. Generally, PIPE investors
in a Rule 506 offering are all accredited purchasers. 80
Legal and Regulatory Framework, in PIPES: A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC
EQUITY, supra note 1, at 77, 85 (discussing the Rule 504, 505, and 508 exceptions).
Importantly, unlike Rule 506 exemption, which is preempted from state regulation,
§18(b)(4)(D) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(4)(D), the Rule 504 and Rule 505
exemptions are regulated by the states. Due to the objectives of avoiding additional costs
and “overzealous” state regulators, PIPE offerings generally rely on the Rule 506
exemption.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a)(2006) (“Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that
satisfy the conditions in paragraph (b) of [Rule 506] shall be deemed to be a transaction not
involving any public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of the [1933] Act.”).
77. An exception to this generalization is Rule 502’s ban on general solicitation and
advertising. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c).
78. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2) (2006).
79. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(1), 230.502(c) (2006).
80. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 69, at § 1:17 (“an issuer is not required to deliver
disclosure documents to accredited investors”). By contrast, with respect to non-accredited
purchasers, such investors must meet financial sophistication standards and must be
provided with disclosure of specified information. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2). Note also
that the substantial compliance defense is available to Rule 506 issuers and accordingly
affords these issuers more flexibility in satisfying the prerequisites for the exemption.
However, as with Rule 505, the Rule 508 defense is not available for violations of the ban
on general solicitation or the number of non-accredited investors. See 17 C.F.R. §
508(a)(1)-(a)(3). Importantly, as stated above, an additional benefit of the Rule 506 offering
is the preemption of state law regulation that it affords. See National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996). In order for an
offering to qualify for preemption of the state securities regulation framework, the securities
being issued must be considered a “covered security” as defined in Section 18 of the 1933
Act. A “covered security” is defined to include securities issued under the Rule 506
exemption. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2006).
Although not generally used in the PIPE context, there are several other exemptions from
the registration requirement found in Section 5 of the 1933 Act. Section 4(6) of the 1933
Act, for example, is an exemption that reflects Congressional concern that small enterprises
should not be unduly burdened in the process of raising capital. See Adoption of Interim
Notice-Of-Sales Form for Transactions Pursuant to Section 4(6), Securities Act Release No.
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III. EXAMINING THE PIPELINE
While traditional financing options theoretically are available to
smaller publicly held companies, the use of a PIPE may represent the only
viable financing option for such companies. 81 For example, a primary
public offering may prove impractical due to the lack of investment banker
interest, insufficiently widespread support for the company or the securities
to be offered, or the significant expenses that would be incurred. 82
Similarly, many companies are unable to secure conventional debt
financing either because of their overall credit unworthiness or as a result
of the current credit market conditions that have constrained the overall
level at which banks have an appetite to lend. 83 Moreover, even assuming
6256, 1980 WL 25728 (Nov. 7, 1980). In this regard, Section 4(6) exempts offers and sales
from Securities Act registration by any issuer solely to “accredited investors” if the total
amount raised does not exceed the limit articulated in Section 3(b) which is currently set at
$5,000,000. While Section 4(6) places no specified limit on the number of investors that
can participate, all investors must be “accredited.” Significantly, no general solicitation is
allowed and the securities issued in a Section 4(6) offering are restricted from resale. An
issuer using Section 4(6) does not have to provide investors any specific offering
information. Unsurprisingly, the Section 4(6) exemption is not often invoked because
typically, if an offering is exempt under Section 4(6), it is usually exempt under Rule 506 –
a more favorable option given the state law preemption Rule 506 affords.
Other exemptions from Securities Act registration include the intrastate offerings exemption
(§ 3(a)(11) and Rule 147), the Rule 701 exemption (directed toward privately held business
issuing securities as compensation to employees and consultants), and Regulation A (that
allows a non-public company to raise up to $5 million during a twelve-month period by
conducting a “mini-public” offering). See STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 56-71 (discussing the
exemptions just mentioned). These exemptions are rarely, if ever, employed in the context
of PIPEs.
81. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 382 (noting that PIPEs often represent the only
available financing option for many small companies).
82. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
83. See Jane J. Kim, Where Either a Borrower or a Lender Can Be, WALL ST. J., Mar.
12, 2008, at D1 (“As the credit crisis spurs traditional lenders to tighten credit standards and
raise fees, more small-business owners and entrepreneurs are turning to so-called person-toperson lending networks—with names like Prosper, LendingClub.com and Zopa.com — to
help keep their businesses going.”); see also The Credit Crisis: Financial Engine Failure,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2008, at 79 (“The extent of America’s economic woes was underlined
on February 5th when signs of abrupt shrinkage in service industries in January helped push
the S&P 500 stock market index down by 3.2%, its worst one-day fall in almost a year”).
The article also found that, according to the most recent Federal Reserve quarterly survey of
bank-lending officers, “the credit crunch was getting even crunchier” and as a result, “a
good number of banks had imposed stricter lending standards and higher rates on loans
since the previous survey, carried out in October [of 2007]. Id.; see also The Credit
Squeeze: Abandon Ship—The Credit Squeeze, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2007, at 58 (“The
stockmarket has reacted with alarm to this credit squeeze, partly because it was counting on
a continuous stream of debt-financed takeovers to push share prices higher. That confidence
has now gone, and with it the market’s swagger.”); Credit Markets: If at First You Don’t
Succeed, THE ECONOMIST, March 15, 2008 (“The fear is that the financial markets have
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that these issuers are able to secure the debt financing that they seek, these
lenders frequently will require the subject company to agree to onerous
financial and operational covenants—concessions with respect to which the
company may be unwilling or simply unable to adhere. Principally as a
consequence of the foregoing considerations, in recent years, PIPE
transactions have evolved as an increasingly popular and relatively
inexpensive capital-raising technique. 84 The following discussion provides
an overview of PIPEs as a transactional alternative to the currently elusive
traditional sources of capital financing.
A.

PIPEs 101—The Basic Transaction

As briefly discussed above, a PIPE is generally defined as “any
privately negotiated equity or equity-linked investment in a public
company.” 85 In a sense, a PIPE is a hybrid transaction that combines
features of a traditional private placement transaction with a registered
public offering. 86 To illustrate, a PIPE transaction typically begins with the
consummation of a private placement, normally pursuant to Rule 506 of
Regulation D. This private placement effectuates a PIPE purchaser’s direct
investment into the issuing company. 87 Upon completion of the private
placement and pursuant to the contractual terms negotiated, a subject issuer
covenants to file a registration statement covering the shares purchased in
the Rule 506 transaction. 88 Given this structural framework, PIPEs have
achieved popularity because, if executed properly, they can provide an
issuing company with the ability to raise capital fast and efficiently, while
simultaneously offering investors the liquidity generally not available in a
pure private-placement investment. 89
entered a negative spiral, the obverse of the kind of euphoria that drove dotcom stocks to
absurd valuations in 1999 and early 2000. The problems are exacerbated by the demise of
the [securitization] market, and fears about counterparty risk. Both those factors are making
banks less willing to lend—even to worthy borrowers.”).
84. See E. Kurt Kim, The Marketplace: A Statistical Summary, in PIPES: A GUIDE TO
PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC EQUITY 27 (rev. and updated ed. 2006) (describing the
evolution of PIPEs into a preferred financing tool from the mid-1990s until 2004).
85. Dresner, supra note 1, at 1.
86. Lerner, supra note 66, at 655-56.
87. Dresner, supra note 1, at 2-3; see also supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
88. See Jones et al., supra note 10, at 24 (describing the registration requirement
typically required in a PIPE transaction as “a feature that makes PIPEs particularly
appealing to private investors because it provides a potentially quicker and easier exit from
the investment than other forms of private equity financing”).
89. See James F. O’Brien, Jr., A Historical Perspective: The Bubble, Converts, and the
Birth of Structured PIPEs, in PIPES: A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC EQUITY,
at 53-62 (describing the rise in the popularity of PIPEs, which correlated with the rapid
growth of capital markets during the 1990s); see also Lerner, supra note 66, at 657
(explaining that PIPEs allow companies to raise more capital than traditional private
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From a “deal” perspective, a PIPE transaction includes a pure-equity
or equity-linked investment by the respective investor into the issuing
company. 90 Many issuers prefer this financing alternative because it allows
them to secure capital without incurring the cost of a publicly registered
offering up-front. Moreover, the discount provided in PIPEs to the current
price for which a subject company’s stock is selling in the public markets is
more advantageous than the discount generally applicable in a pure private
placement transaction. Similarly, PIPEs offer subject issuers additional
cost savings since these issuers are able to avoid some of the administrative
and advertising costs associated with traditional public (primary or
secondary) offerings. 91
From an investor’s perspective, the principal highlight of a PIPE
transaction is that these investors enjoy a level of liquidity not found in
traditional straight private placement deals. Particularly, by requiring an
issuing company to file and have declared effective a registration statement
covering the underlying common stock, PIPE investors drastically reduce
the illiquidity normally associated with generic private placements, thereby
facilitating a cost-effective exit to their investment. 92 Additional benefits
for PIPE investors include: (i) their potential for superior returns; and (ii)
the various other contractual features that enhance the overall security of
the subject investment. 93
B.

PIPEs—Structural Alternatives

Structurally, a PIPE transaction is the product of a heavily negotiated
process and as such can take one of a myriad of forms based ultimately on
the terms of the transaction, the securities involved, and the particularized
needs of the issuer and investors. 94 Nonetheless, there are predominantly
two forms a PIPE transaction can take: traditional or structured. 95
In a traditional PIPE, the issuing company covenants to file a
registration statement covering the applicable securities with the SEC

investments and to accurately predict the amount of cash that will be raised at the close of
the transaction).
90. Dresner, supra note 1, at 2.
91. See Lerner, supra note 66, at 663-64 (noting that PIPEs are often more costeffective for issuing companies, in part, because they afford these companies the ability to
“bypass ‘road shows’” and advertising that are usually required for successful secondary
public offerings).
92. Id. at 662; see also Jones et al., supra note 10, at 24 (explaining the liquidity
advantages that make PIPEs attractive to private investors).
93. Lerner, supra note 66, at 662.
94. See Gormley, supra note 15, at 9, 13 (observing that the PIPE investment
community “remains a highly negotiated marketplace”).
95. Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 384.
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promptly after the closing of the private offering made pursuant to Rule
506 of Regulation D. Accordingly, the private placement component is
consummated before the registration statement covering the securities
issued pursuant to it is effective. A traditional PIPE usually involves the
sale of common stock at a fixed price that is determined in one of three
ways: (i) a discount from market price; (ii) a premium to the market price;
or (iii) at the market price of the company’s common stock. 96
Alternatively, a traditional PIPE may consist of a sale of preferred
stock which the investor has the option to convert into common stock
pursuant to a negotiated and fixed conversion ratio. In a traditional PIPE
involving preferred stock, the convertible preferred shares may also give
the investor a right to dividends and similar rights in a sale, merger, or
liquidation of the issuing company. 97 In fact, in many situations where an
investor receives these additional benefits, the transaction is priced at or
near the current market prices of the company’s common stock. 98 One of
the primary disadvantages inherent in the traditional PIPE structure is that,
while the issuer is contractually obligated to file and have a registration
statement declared effective, this process is subject to the SEC’s regulatory
scrutiny and can therefore be delayed. 99 This, in turn, creates a period of
illiquidity that is ultimately factored into the investors’ discount on the
acquired securities. Additionally, since the private placement portion of
the traditional PIPE deal is finalized prior to the filing of the registration
statement, investors are committed to purchase, irrespective of whether
there is a decline in the issuing company’s stock price in the interim period

96. Id.; see Gerald T. Lins et al., Private Investments in Public Equities (PIPEs), in
HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE § 6:39.50 (20072008 ed.) (explaining that the timing of registration statements for these securities allows
quicker liquidity for investors); see also Harold S. Bloomenthal, Small Businesses–
Additional Regulatory Relief, 30 No. 2 SEC. & FED. CORP. L. REP. 1 (Feb. 2008) (explaining
the time period that a registration statement becomes effective after filing); Sarah S. Gold &
Richard L. Spinogatti, Corporate and Securities Litigation: SEC’s PIPEs Short Sales
Theory Fails, 239 N.Y.L.J. 3 (col. 1) (Feb. 13, 2008) (noting that PIPEs may be exempt
from the registration requirements that normally apply to public sales of unregistered
securities).
97. Lerner, supra note 66, at 663.
98. Id. at 662.
99. See Prior Delivery of Preliminary Prospectus, Securities Act Release No. 4968, 34
Fed. Reg. 7235 (Apr. 24, 1969) (noting the high volume of registration statements the SEC
must process); Elimination of Certain Pricing Amendments and Revision of Prospectus
Filing Procedures, Securities Act Release No. 6714, 52 Fed. Reg. 21252 (May 27, 1987)
(attempting to simplify the registration process); Simplification of Registration Procedures
for Primary Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6964, Exchange Act Release
No. 31345, 57 Fed. Reg. 48970 (Oct. 22, 1992) (attempting to further reduce delays in the
registration process); Carl Schneider et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and
Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1, 19-22 (1981) (describing the often frustrating process
employed by the SEC when it reviews filings).
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between the private placement’s closing and the registration statement’s
effectiveness. 100
Similar to the traditional PIPE, the structured PIPE is a transactional
variety pursuant to which the issuing company generally will sell preferred
stock or debt securities that are convertible into the company’s common
stock. 101 Unlike the traditional PIPE, in a structured PIPE transaction an
investor’s obligation to purchase shares may be contingent on a registration
statement covering those securities being declared effective by the SEC. 102
In such transactions, the closing generally is delayed until the effective date
of the registration statement. This enables the PIPE investor to engineer an
exit strategy for its prospective investment prior to becoming legally
obligated to acquire the securities.
In contrast to a traditional PIPE, the conversion price in a structured
PIPE is usually variable and contractually linked to a reset mechanism that
automatically adjusts the price downwards if the market price of the
company’s common stock falls below the conversion or reset price fixed at
the time of issuance. 103 For this reason, a structured PIPE is generally more
advantageous to PIPE investors because of the price protection afforded by
the conversion ratio reset mechanism. 104
100. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 384. Approximately 83% of the 1,343 PIPE deals
that closed in 2006 involved traditional PIPEs. Id.
101. See Jones et al., supra note 10, at 24 (noting that structured PIPEs generally involve
the sale of: (i) convertible debentures or convertible preferred shares (where the conversion
price is based on the future market price of the common equity), or (ii) convertible and
common equity with a reset feature (where the share price or conversion price is reduced at
a later date if the share price goes below a certain threshold), or (iii) fluctuating convertible
(where the purchase price is linked to the future market price of the common equity - and as
a result the securities issued in a structured PIPE frequently represent a larger percentage of
the issuer’s outstanding share capital than in a traditional PIPE)).
102. See Overview:
Private Investment in Public Equity (“PIPES”),
www.friedlandworldwide.com (July 25, 2005).
103. See O’Brien, supra note 89, at 61. Structured PIPEs often involve a sale of
variable-priced securities (for example: floating ratio convertible debt) or a sale of
securities accompanied by variable-priced sweeteners, which often lead to “toxic PIPES” or
“death spirals” because these conversion ratios are inherently tied to the performance of the
underlying stock after the PIPE issuance. As such, structured PIPEs enable investors to
convert their PIPE securities into a greater number of issuer shares in the event the issuer’s
stock performs poorly after the PIPE is announced publicly and thus, arguably protects an
investment against unexpected price declines that may occur during the period between the
issuance and the effectiveness of the registration statement. However, these conversion
ratios also render structured PIPEs more subject to market manipulation by investors,
especially when one takes into consideration the aggressive short selling of the underlying
equity shares that normally occurs during this interim period. Particularly, this shorting
activity drives down the price of the issuer’s stock while resulting in a more favorable
conversion ratio. The primary problem with this strategy is that it can cause excessive
dilution which diminishes the value of other existing shareholders’ shares.
104. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 384-85 (“[W]ith a structured PIPE, investors do not
assume price risk during the pendency of the resale registration statement”).
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Concomitantly, this same feature makes the structured PIPE more
risky for issuers since the conversion ratio may be calibrated in a way that,
when triggered by the downward movement of the stock’s price, exposes
the company’s existing shareholders to a significant risk of dilution. 105 The
dilution risk inherent in structured PIPE transactions is evidenced in the
PIPE transactional paradigm known as a “death spiral” or “toxic PIPE.” 106
In these infamous PIPE transactions, reset provisions function as generally
designed to automatically reset the exercise price if the price of the
underlying stock falls below a contractually established threshold. As a
consequence, this extreme downward pressure is placed on the underlying
PIPE shares, a reality that is often compounded by the aggregate impact of
investors shorting the stock on the open market. The cumulative effect of
this shorting activity places greater downward pressure on the stock’s
market price, which in turn enables PIPE investors to make higher returns
pursuant to their automatic reset provisions. 107 This downward pressure on
the stock price, accelerating a dilutive cycle, adversely impacts the issuer’s
public shareholders. In sum, “[b]ecause the reset provision rewards the
[PIPE] investor with more shares to match the original investment, this
means that the lower the stock price goes, the greater dilution from
conversion of the preferred, and the less value each common share
holds.” 108 The “death spiral” scenario is partly responsible for the negative
perception that dominated during the early days of the PIPE’s emergence
onto the capital financing landscape. 109 Nonetheless, more recently, both
the private and regulatory sectors have responded in a manner that largely
has relegated the “death spiral” to the proverbial sidelines in the context of
PIPE transactions. Thus, while the conditions surrounding these “toxic”
transactions had deleterious effects on the PIPE market, they also led to
innovative responses that serve a remedial role in the demise of “death
spirals.” 110
C.

PIPEs—Market Evolution

PIPEs emerged onto the investment landscape as a capital financing
alternative approximately twenty years ago. During early days, PIPEs were
regarded as a disfavored financing alternative generally used only by cashstrapped small-capitalization companies in dire need of financing.
105. See Lerner, supra note 66, at 664-66 (describing the toxic PIPE transaction).
106. Id. at 657-61.
107. See Lerner, supra note 66, at 664-66; Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 385.
108. Lerner, supra note 66, at 664.
109. Id.
110. Id. The foregoing overview illustrates how a PIPE transaction provides issuers with
the ability to efficiently raise capital in a targeted, customized manner. See Gormley, supra
note 15, at 15.
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However, as time went on, both the investment community and issuers
alike began to realize the versatility inherent in the PIPE transactional
structure and increased the rate at which they resorted to it as a capitalraising strategy. 111 Gaining recognition, PIPEs today have expanded to
include more established issuers who seek to benefit from the efficiency
and cost effectiveness that PIPEs bring to the table. 112
D.

PIPEs—Transactional Considerations

Traditionally, PIPEs have been viewed as an important financing
alternative for relatively small companies. In fact, recent estimates indicate
that smaller companies still represent the largest category of PIPE
Yet, while micro-cap (i.e., companies with a market
issuers. 113
capitalization of under $250 million) to mid-cap companies (i.e.,
companies with a market capitalization of between one and five billion)
traditionally have comprised the largest constituency of PIPE issuers, a new
group of investors, namely hedge funds, are increasingly developing a
financial appetite for PIPE transactions. To illustrate, recent estimates
indicate that hedge funds currently constitute about 80% of the investors in
micro-cap PIPEs. PIPEs are attractive to hedge funds because they provide
an optimal transactional context in which these funds can leverage their
technical expertise by using sophisticated trading strategies. Hedge funds
often use a strategy whereby they sell short the issuing company’s common
stock promptly after a PIPE deal is closed. By using this strategy, hedge
funds may effectively lock in the purchase discount, thereby profiting
irrespective of a rise or fall in the issuer’s share price. 114
However, this portrayal of hedge funds being able to effortlessly reap
the benefit of PIPE transactions is often not the reality. Specifically, in
order to execute their short-selling strategy, hedge funds must be able to
secure (normally through borrowing) shares to cover their short position.
At times, the strategy has been impeded because some PIPE issuers have
thinly-traded stock, and consequently, investing hedge funds trading in
such PIPE shares may not be able to find enough shares to cover their short
positions. 115 That deficiency has prompted some hedge funds to rely on
what are known as “naked shorts.” 116 The SEC, displeased with this
111. See id. (describing the growth of the PIPE market as a financing option).
112. Id. at 19.
113. Id.
114. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 387.
115. Id. at 388.
116. According to the SEC, “[i]n a ‘naked’ short sale, the seller does not borrow or
arrange to borrow the securities in time to make delivery to the buyer within the standard
three-day settlement period. As a result, the seller fails to deliver securities to the buyer
when delivery is due; this is known as a ‘failure to deliver’ or ‘fail.’” Naked Short Sales,
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allegedly illegal strategy, has stepped up its regulatory oversight of hedge
funds in the PIPE arena accordingly. 117
Like any complex business transaction, a PIPE “deal” is completed by
the execution of a number of different agreements, including: (i) a
Securities Purchase Agreement; (ii) a Registration Rights Agreement; (iii) a
Warrant Agreement (assuming applicability); and (iv) a Legal Opinion.
Generally, after the completion of the preliminary and subsequent
negotiation phases of the PIPE offering, the issuer and investors will agree
on final versions of the foregoing agreements described above and execute
them. Subsequent to the closing, the company will endeavor to prepare and
file a registration statement covering the securities, thereby enabling the
non-affiliated investors to freely resell the securities. Usually, the issuer
will be required to file the registration statement anywhere between 90 and
120 days after the closing of the PIPE transaction. In most cases, the issuer
will be contractually obligated to use its best efforts to have the registration
statement declared effective by the SEC, an event that constitutes the
consummation of the PIPE transaction. 118
http://www.sec.gov/answers/nakedshortsale.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
117. For example, in SEC v. Langley Partners, L.P., Langley Partners, North Olmsted
Partners and Quantico Partners (collectively, “Langley”) and their portfolio manager,
Jeffrey Thorp (“Thorp”), established naked short positions in a PIPE issuer through Langley
Partners’ Canadian broker-dealer prior to the effective date of the resale registration
statement covering the underlying PIPE shares. In order to cover its short positions,
Langley Partners either: (i) directly transferred its PIPE shares to its Canadian account or
instructed its Canadian broker to sell its PIPE shares on a particular exchange and buy the
same number of shares at the same time and price on the same exchange, (ii) journaled its
PIPE shares from its cash account at its prime broker to its short account with instructions to
cover its short position, or (iii) used cooperating market makers to purchase the PIPE shares
from Langley Partners and then sell the shares back to Langley Partners, where the
“washed” shares were used to cover the short position. The SEC charged Thorp with a
violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act, alleging that he covered the pre-effective date
short positions with shares he received in the PIPE transaction (or with “washed” shares)
and “shares used to cover a short sale are deemed to have been sold when the short sale was
made.” Thus, the SEC alleged that “Thorp and Langley employed an unlawful trading
strategy in violation of the antifraud and registration provisions of the federal securities
laws.” Complaint, SEC v. Langley Partners, L.P., No. 1:06CV00467 (D.D.C. 2006); see
also In re Spinner Asset Mgmt., LLC and Spinner Global Tech. Fund, Ltd., Securities Act
Release No. 8763 (Dec. 20, 2006) (alleging that a company placed matching buy and sell
orders with respect to the PIPE shares in order to “make it appear that [it] was covering the
short positions with open market shares,” and as such violated Section 5 of the 1933 Act);
Complaint, SEC v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., No. 06-CV-02160 (D.D.C 2006)
(alleging that a violation of Section 5 of the 1933 Act occurred where FBR sold shares short
prior to effectiveness of PIPE issuer’s registration statement, purchased the PIPE shares
from FBR clients that invested in the PIPE and then used the shares to cover its preexisting
short position).
118. While a PIPE issuer’s obligation to have the SEC find effectiveness after the
registration statement is generally limited, the issuing company will generally be required to
keep the registration statement current during the entire time that the PIPE investors are
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IV. RECENT REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS IMPACTING PIPES
While the foregoing discussion highlights PIPEs as a relatively
inexpensive and effective alternative that enables a company to attain
capital financing, there are a number of recent regulatory developments that
have impacted the vitality of the PIPE market. This section of the article
discusses these developments and assesses their overall cumulative impact
on the PIPE market.
A.

Potentially Positive Developments
1.

Rule 144 Amendments

Recently, the SEC comprehensively amended Rule 144 in a manner
that may benefit PIPE transactions. 119 In particular, the SEC shortened the
holding period requirement under Rule 144 for “restricted securities” of
issuers that are subject to the Exchange Act reporting requirements.
Pursuant to the recent amendments, the new six-month holding period
requirement (from the previous one-year period) will apply to the securities
of an issuer that has been subject to the reporting requirements of Section
13 or 15(d) of the 1934 Exchange Act for a period of at least 90 days
before the Rule 144 sale. 120 In amending the Rule, the SEC stated that a
core objective of Rule 144 is to provide clear and objective criteria for

actively engaged in the reselling of their restricted securities pursuant to the registration
statement. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 393-95.
119. Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 33-8869, 72 Fed. Reg.
71,546 (Dec. 17, 2007) (hereinafter “Rule 144 Release”].
120. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144 (2006) (addressing the calculation of the holding period
of restricted securities). Note that the issuer must continue to provide Exchange Act
periodic reports for an additional six-month period. Rule 144 Release, supra note 118, at
71,550. Restricted securities of a “non-reporting issuer” will continue to be subject to a
one-year holding period requirement. Id. at 71,549. A non-reporting issuer is one that is
not, or has not been for a period of at least 90 days before the Rule 144 sale, subject to the
reporting requirements of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act. Id. at 71,568. The SEC
believes that different holding periods for reporting and non-reporting issuers are
appropriate given that reporting issuers have an obligation to file periodic reports with
updated financial information (including audited financial information in annual filings that
are publicly available on EDGAR, the Commission’s electronic filing system). Id. at
71,549. In 2006, the volume of transactions filed under Rule 144 exceeded $71 billion, and
more than 50% of U.S. public companies, large and small alike, every year have had at least
one transaction reported on Form 144. Id. at 71,562. As such, decreasing the regulatory
burdens associated with these transactions will ultimately reduce the cost of capital to these
companies. Id. Note, moreover, that with respect to restricted securities of non-reporting
companies, a non-affiliate can freely resell all of its holdings (not subject to a volume
limitation) after a one-year holding period. Id. at 71,550. This is an expansion from the
previous two-year period.
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determining whether a person reselling securities initially acquired in a
transaction that rendered them restricted did so with impermissible
distributive intent. In this regard, the Rule 144 holding period has
traditionally been a key criterion established to demonstrate that a selling
security holder did not acquire the securities sought to be sold under Rule
144 with impermissible distributive intent. The SEC further asserted that
reducing the holding period to the new six-month requirement would
remove unnecessary impediments to the process of capital formation and
will, as a result, have an overall beneficial impact on the private placement
market. 121 Indeed, most commentators that have opined on the overall
impact of the recent amendments have observed that the new holding
period will increase the liquidity of privately sold securities and decrease
the cost of capital for reporting issuers. 122 Indeed, the SEC’s endorsement
of the six-month holding period illustrates the Commission’s commitment
to the implementation of rules that help companies, especially smaller
companies, raise capital more efficiently and less expensively. 123
Nonetheless, two commentators, namely the North American
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) and one of these
authors 124 take the position that the SEC’s six-month holding period is
unduly short and makes a mockery of existing case law. For example, in
United States v. Sherwood, 125 the federal district court applied a two-year
holding period as a crude rule of thumb to determine whether the subject
shareholder took with distributive intent. 126 In adopting Rule 144 in 1972,

121. See Rule 144 Release, supra note 119, at 71,549 (stating that the SEC did “not want
the holding period to be longer than necessary or impose any unnecessary costs or
restrictions on capital formation” and that “[a]fter observing the operation of Rule 144 since
the 1997 amendments, [the SEC] believe[s] that a six-month holding period for securities of
reporting issuers provides a reasonable indication that an investor has assumed the economic
risk of investment in the securities”).
122. Chivers & Cole, 144A Offerings—Potential New Liquidity Option for Sponsors
(Dec. 2007), http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=8504.
123. According to the SEC, “by making private offerings more attractive, the
amendments may allow some companies to avoid certain types of costly financing structures
involving the issuance of extremely dilutive convertible securities”). SEC Release, supra
note 119.
124. See Rule 144 Release, supra note 119, at 71,548 n.32 (noting NASAA and Marc I.
Steinberg).
125. United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
126. Id. at 483 (“The passage of two years before the commencement of distribution of
any of these shares is an insuperable obstacle to my finding that Sherwood took these shares
with a view to distribution thereof, in the absence of any relevant evidence from which I
could conclude he did not take the shares for investment.”); see also SEC v. Kern, 425 F.3d
143, 148-50 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding a violation of Rule 144(k) when a seller of unregistered
securities failed to allow two years to elapse between acquiring securities from the issuer
and the execution of subsequent sales).
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the SEC held firm to this two-year holding period. 127 Over the years,
through amendments to Rule 144, the Commission has decreased the twoyear period to as short as six months. 128 Nowhere does the Commission
127. Definition of Terms “Underwriter” and “Brokers’ Transactions,” Security Act
Release No. 5223, 37 Fed. Reg. 591, 593 (January 14, 1972). In that release, the SEC
stated:
[A] holding period prior to resale [of restricted securities] is essential, among
other reasons, to assure that those persons who buy [such securities in offerings
exempt from registration] have assumed the economic risks of investment, and
therefore, are not acting as conduits for sale to the public of unregistered
securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an issuer. It should be noted that
there is nothing in Section 2(11) which places a time limit on a person’s status
as an underwriter. The public has the same need for protection afforded by
registration whether the securities are distributed shortly after their purchase or
after a considerable length of time.
....
[Restricted] [s]ecurities sold in reliance upon the rule must have been
beneficially owned and fully paid for by the seller for a holding period of at
least 2 years prior to his sale as specified below. This condition is designed to
assure that the registration provisions of the Act are not circumvented by
persons acting, directly or indirectly, as conduits for an issuer in connection
with resales of restricted securities. In order to accomplish this, the rule
provides that such persons be subject to the full economic risks of the
investment during the holding period . . . .
Id. at 593; see also Marc I. Steinberg & Joseph P. Kempler, The Application and
Effectiveness of SEC Rule 144, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 482 (1988) (addressing the two year
holding requirement for restricted securities).
128. See Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act
Release No. 7390, 63 SEC Docket 2077, at 1-2 (Feb. 20, 1997) (explaining the SEC’s
decision to shorten the holding periods for restricted securities). In that release, the
Commission stated:
Today, for the first time since the adoption of Rule 144 in 1972, the
Commission is adopting amendments to shorten the holding period that must be
satisfied before limited resales of restricted securities may be made by affiliates
and non-affiliates in reliance upon the rule. As had been proposed, the
amendments reduce that holding period from two years to one year. Also as
proposed, the amendments reduce the length of the holding period that nonaffiliates must hold restricted securities before making unlimited resales of such
securities from three years to two years.
The Commission is adopting the shortened holding periods based on its more
than 20 years of experience with Rule 144 and the favorable public comments
received on the 1995 Release. Shorter holding periods should reduce the cost of
capital. This particularly should benefit smaller companies, which often sell
securities in private placements. A shorter holding period should lower the
illiquidity discount given by companies raising capital in private placements and
increase the usefulness of the Rule 144 safe harbor.
. . . The Commission believes that the shorter holding periods will not diminish
investor protection, since they are sufficiently long to ensure that resales under
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adequately explain how this new policy squares with established case law.
Neither does the SEC reasonably set forth how this drastic shortening of
the Rule 144 holding period promotes investor protection. Indeed, nonaffiliates of non-reporting companies today can reload all of their holdings
after a one-year holding period, with little information being available in
the public domain. 129 Such lack of transparency in public markets may be
Rule 144 will not facilitate indirect public distributions of unregistered
securities by issuers or affiliates.
Id. at 2. See generally Rule 144 Release, supra note 119.
129. Generally, Rule 15c2-11 prohibits broker-dealers from publishing a quotation for
any security unless specified information is available with respect to the issuer and the
security. In effect, the rule prevents the widespread distribution of securities without certain
minimal information being publicly available. Hence, Rule 15c2-11(a)(5) calls for the
following information to be reasonably current and to be made reasonably available by the
subject broker or dealer upon the request of a prospective purchaser:
(i) the exact name of the issuer and its predecessor (if any);
(ii) the address of its principal executive offices;
(iii) the state of incorporation, if it is a corporation;
(iv) the exact title and class of the security;
(v) the par or stated value of the security;
(vi) the number of shares or total amount of the securities outstanding as of the
end of the issuer’s most recent fiscal year;
(vii) the name and address of the transfer agent;
(viii) the nature of the issuer’s businesses;
(ix) the nature of products or services offered;
(x) the nature and extent of the issuer’s facilities;
(xi) the name of the chief executive officer and members of the board of
directors;
(xii) the issuer’s most recent balance sheet and profit and loss and retained
earnings statements;
(xiii) similar financial information for such part of the two preceding fiscal
years as the issuer or its predecessor has been in existence;
(xiv) whether the broker or dealer or any associated person is affiliated, directly
or indirectly, with the issuer;
(xv) whether the quotation is being published or submitted on behalf of any
other broker or dealer, and, if so, the name of such broker or dealer; and
(xvi) whether the quotation is being submitted or published directly or indirectly
on behalf of the issuer, or any director, officer or any person, directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of the outstanding units
or shares of any equity security of the issuer, and, if so, the name of such
person, and the basis for any exemption under the federal securities laws for any
sales of such securities on behalf of such person.
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viewed as antithetical to the best interests of the investing public. 130
Nonetheless, one significant aspect of the recent Rule 144
amendments that will likely benefit certain PIPE investors is the SEC’s
decision not to adopt a proposed amendment that would have included a
tolling provision. This tolling provision would have tolled or suspended
the holding period for a security holder that maintained a short position in,
or any put or other option to dispose of, the security equivalent to the
restricted securities owned by the security holder. This particular
amendment was originally proposed based on the SEC’s concern over the
effect of hedging activities that are designed to shift the economic risk of
investment away from the security holder in the context of PIPE
transactions. 131 However, after considering the comment letters received
on this topic, the SEC decided against adopting the proposed tolling
provision. In doing so, the Commission noted that “in the current
environment, the tolling provision would unduly complicate Rule 144 and
could require security holders or brokers to incur significant costs to
monitor hedging positions for purposes of determining whether they have
met the holding period requirement.” 132 The SEC further noted that
adopting the proposed tolling provision would likely frustrate the
Commission’s objective of streamlining Rule 144, seeking to reduce the
costs associated with capital formation for relatively small companies. 133
In sum, the recent changes to Rule 144 will likely have a beneficial
impact on PIPE transactions. These amendments reduce the regulatory
requirements for the resale of securities and, to a large extent, simplify the
process of reselling such securities. 134 Prior to the amendments, a security
holder relying on the Rule 144 safe harbor for the resale of restricted
securities was required to wait at least one year after the securities were last
sold by the issuer or an affiliate before such securities could be legally sold
under Rule 144. The recent Rule 144 amendments have reduced this
holding period requirement to six months for the resale of restricted
securities of Exchange Act reporting companies. One instant benefit that
this change will have in the context of PIPE transactions is that it will
increase the liquidity of securities sold in private transactions—a vital
component of every PIPE transaction. Another benefit is that enhanced
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11.
130. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Administrative,
Enforcement, and Legislative Programs and Policies–Their Influence on Corporate Internal
Affairs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173 (1982) (making this point with respect to other SEC
actions). Please note that Mr. Obi does not concur in this paragraph of the article.
131. Rule 144 Release, supra note 119, 72 Fed. Reg. at 71,566.
132. Id. at 71,552.
133. Id.
134. The SEC nonetheless observed that it “will revisit the issue if [it] observe[s] abuse
relating to the hedging activities of holders of restricted securities.” Id.
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pricing efficiency should ensue, to the extent that companies will now be
able to sell securities in private offerings at prices closer to those that can
be procured in the public markets, without the costs incurred in a traditional
registered SEC offering. As a result, the Rule 144 amendments should
further facilitate a subject company’s ability to raise capital in private
securities transactions through the effective and strategic use of PIPEs. 135
2.

SEC Enforcement Actions

As briefly mentioned above, the SEC staff has recently elevated its
regulatory oversight of certain PIPE transactions and the PIPE market as a
whole. Due to the increasing complexity and prevalence of PIPE
transactions, 136 the Commission’s concern focuses on the possibility of
investor abuse inherent in the PIPE transactional landscape. In fact, the
SEC’s recent regulatory activity in this context is premised on welldocumented abuses in the PIPEs context, particularly the risk that the
issuance of a large number of shares through a private offering can flood
the market and have the unfortunate effect of diluting the value of shares
held by other shareholders of the issuing company. 137 Based on this
concern, the SEC has sought to reign in PIPE transactions and the PIPE
market as a whole. A key component of the SEC’s recent regulatory
arsenal against PIPEs is the initiation of enforcement actions based on
alleged Section 5 registration violations. The following discussion will
illustrate that recent cases have questioned the ultimate viability of the
SEC’s Section 5 claims in this context, a result arguably beneficial to the
PIPE market and its participants.
One of the most recent of the various regulatory tactics that has been
employed by the SEC in connection with PIPEs is the use of enforcement
actions premised on alleged Section 5 registration violations. 138 Since
applicable securities laws provide that, absent an exemption, a security
must be sold in compliance with the Section 5 registration requirement, i.e.,
a registration statement is filed by the issuer and subsequently declared
effective by the SEC, PIPE shares normally are issued pursuant to the Rule
506 exemption. 139 In a number of recent actions, the Commission has
135. See Max Frumes, SEC Shortens, Grandfathers Rule 144 Holding Funds, 5 PIPEs
Report No. 22, at 1 (Dec. 18, 2007).
136. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
137. See Gold & Spinogatta, supra note 96, at 3 (“[PIPE enforcement] actions are part of
the SEC’s aggressive enforcement effort aimed at perceived abuses involving PIPE
transactions”).
138. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 407-07.
139. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. The reliance of PIPE issuers on an
applicable exemption is a factor that often leads PIPE issuing companies to require PIPE
investors to contractually pledge that they will refrain from immediately selling or otherwise
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asserted that short sales effected in connection with PIPE transactions
constitute Section 5 violations “because shares used to cover a short sale
are deemed to have been sold when the short sale was made.” 140 The locus
of the SEC’s argument in these cases is not that the basic short selling
activity itself is illegal. Rather, the SEC’s position, as articulated in several
of these cases, is that PIPE investors violate federal securities laws when
they use the actual restricted PIPE shares, as opposed to the respective
companies existing unrestricted non-PIPE shares, to cover or otherwise
close their short positions irrespective of the fact that a registration
statement covering the subject shares had been declared effective prior to
the covering. The critical analytical issue underlying the SEC’s position is
the question of whether the commencement of a short sale of PIPE shares
during the pendency of the registration statement constitutes a sale for
purposes of determining compliance with applicable Section 5
requirements.
The Commission’s perspective is that such execution of a short
position indeed constitutes a sale for Section 5 purposes. The first part of
its analysis usually begins with the assertion that the subject securities were
sold pursuant to a private placement exemption and were thus restricted
from resale. Consequently, these securities could only be resold if they
were registered with the SEC or an available exemption from registration is
perfected. 141 The SEC thereupon asserts that the defendant sold PIPE
shares into the market prior to the subject registration statement being
declared effective in strict contravention of the proscriptions found in
The Commission posits that the subject defendants
Section 5. 142
distributing PIPE shares in a manner that would jeopardize the continuing availability of the
applicable exemption. See Gold & Spinogatti, supra note 96, at 3 (noting that “PIPE issuers
customarily require investors to pledge that they will refrain from immediately
redistributing their PIPE shares to the public in order to ensure the applicability of that
exemption”).
140. See infra note 148 and accompanying text; see also Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 404.
In practice, this often happens because investors want to hedge their investment during the
period between the acquisition of the restricted shares and the effective date of the
registration statement by selling short a corresponding number of the PIPE issuer’s publiclytraded securities. A conventional short sale is when an investor sells a security that he does
not own by borrowing the security, typically from a broker, and at a later date the investor
closes out the short position by purchasing the security and returning it to the lender. See 17
C.F.R. § 242.200(a) (2006).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (exempting from § 5 “transactions by any person other than an
issuer, underwriter, or dealer”). Section 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act defines the term
“underwriter,” among other things, as “any person who has purchased from an issuer with a
view to . . . the distribution of any security.” But see 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (setting forth
conditions under which a person who sells restricted securities “shall be deemed not to be
engaged in a distribution of such securities and therefore not to be an underwriter thereof
within the meaning of Section 2(a)(11) of the [Securities] Act”).
142. See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Spiegel, Inc., No. 03C-1685, 2003 U.S. Dist. 17933

34

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:1

accordingly are selling PIPE shares in an unregistered manner not
compliant with Rule 144 and are therefore presumed to be underwriters,
and are thereby unable to avail themselves of the protection afforded by the
Section 4(1) exemption. In the SEC’s view, because these PIPE investors
effectuated short sales that were not registered or privately placed via the
perfection of an applicable exemption, their transactions, in essence,
violated Section 5. 143
It has been suggested that, while the SEC’s recent approach to short
selling in this context may arguably have some theoretical substantive
merit, it has anomalous practical effects, particularly since this regulatory
interpretation does not advance the disclosure objectives underlying the
Section 5 registration requirement. 144 Similarly, while the SEC’s position
on PIPE short sales as it relates to the Section 5 registration requirement is
based on the perception that to do otherwise would enable hedging PIPE
investors to inappropriately insulate their transactions from market risk,
this rationale may be flawed because it infuses a formidable, yet
unnecessary, regulatory impediment that constricts an investor’s ability to
utilize generally permitted trading strategies in the context of PIPE
transactions. 145 Additionally, and indeed, somewhat inconsistent with the
foregoing rationale, the SEC, in fact, has given its approbation to hedging
in connection with PIPE transactions. 146

(N.D. IL 2003) at 6 available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compl8020.htm.
143. While the foregoing may indicate that the SEC has banned hedging in connection
with PIPE transactions, this is actually not accurate. See Spinner Asset Management, LLC,
SEC Order, Securities Act Release No. 2573 (Dec. 20, 2006) available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/33-8763.pdf. In fact, in the foregoing recent
administrative order the SEC articulated its position on the issue as follows:
Many PIPE investors ‘hedge’ their investment by selling short the PIPE issuer’s
securities before the resale registration statement is declared effective. There is
nothing per se illegal about ‘hedging’ a PIPE investment by selling short the
issuer’s securities. Such short sales do not violate the registration provisions of
the Securities Act if, among other things, the investor closes out the short
position with shares purchased in the open market.
144. See SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). In this context the court
found that “[i]n addition to its inherent logical implausibility, the SEC’s characterization of
a short sale does not advance the purposes that animate Section 5’s registration
requirement.” Id. at 455 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (noting that “[t]he
primary purposes of the Securities Act is to protect investors by requiring publication of
material information thought necessary to allow them to make informed investment decision
concerning public offerings of securities in interstate commerce.”)).
145. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 407-08 (arguing that there are at least two additional
problems with the SEC’s justification in this regard: (i) Section 5 is primarily concerned
about ensuring adequate disclosure, not preventing investors from avoiding market risk and
(ii) the SEC allows PIPE investors to avoid market risk by short selling so long as the short
position is covered by shares purchased in the open market).
146. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding the SEC’s reliance on Section 5 as a regulatory
sword in the PIPE context, a number of recent cases have squarely called
into question the viability of the SEC’s Section 5 interpretation as applied
to PIPE transactions where investors hedge using short sales or similar
transactions. 147 For example, in SEC v. Mangan the SEC filed an action
against former Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., Inc. registered
representative John F. Mangan Jr. alleging, among other things, the sale of
unregistered securities in violation of Section 5 and in connection with
certain PIPE transactions. According to the complaint, Mangan allegedly
purchased 80,000 shares of a Nasdaq-listed company, CompuDyne Corp.,
in a PIPE transaction. Similar to many other PIPE investors, the defendant
in this case then hedged the PIPE shares by selling short an equal number
of CompuDyne shares. The complaint further alleged that, subsequent to
the private placement, CompuDyne filed a registration statement for the
resale of its PIPE shares, and after this registration statement was declared
effective, Mangan allegedly used the PIPE shares to cover his short
position in the company’s stock. The gravamen of the SEC’s complaint
was the contention that Mangan’s short sales were equivalent to actionable
violations of Section 5.
Interestingly, unlike several other SEC
enforcement actions in this area, 148 the SEC did not allege that Mangan’s
short sales were executed through “matched orders,” 149 “wash sales,” 150 or
“naked,” 151 shorts—transactions the SEC has historically seen as
evidencing a deceptive intent. Rather, the SEC primarily alleged that
Mangan violated Section 5 by engaging in a hedging strategy that consisted
of him covering his pre-effective short positions with PIPE shares. 152
147. SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Complaint, SEC v. Mangan,
2006 WL 4036641, No. 06-0531 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 28, 2006); Complaint, SEC v. Berlacher,
No. 07-3800 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2007).
148. See Langley Partners, supra note 117 (alleging unlawful trading strategy involving
washed shares). Note that the SEC has initiated several enforcement actions based on
alleged insider trading in the PIPE setting. See, e.g., SEC v. Deephaven Capital
Management, LLC, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 19683 (D.D.C. 2006); SEC v. Shane, SEC Press Rel.
No. 2005-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); SEC v. Pollet, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 19199 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
See generally WILLIAM H. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (2d ed. 2005).
149. “Marched orders” are a illegal manipulative technique of offsetting buy and sell
orders to create the impression of activity in a security, thereby causing upward price
movement that benefits the participants in the scheme. See, e.g., SEC v. Lybrand, 200 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
150. According to the SEC’s articulation, a “wash sale” is when an investor buys and
sells the same security at the same time or within a short period of time. Wash sales violate
the federal securities laws, specifically Section 9(a)(1)(A) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, if they are done to create the false or misleading appearance of
active trading in a security. See SEC, Wash Sales, www.sec.gov/answers/wash.htm (last
visited Sept. 17, 2008).
151. See supra note 116.
152. This case is in line with several enforcement actions brought against PIPE investors
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In dismissing the SEC’s complaint, the federal district judge in
Mangan concluded:
The government’s allegation of a Section 5 violation is certainly
creative. And while there seems little doubt that the defendant
sold short anticipating the receipt of PIPE shares to cover the
short, it’s also true that in any case he would have had to cover
with the shares purchased in the open market should the PIPE fail
to close or been withdrawn or otherwise not be available to
produce those shares. Anybody who bought at the sale of the
securities got CompuDyne. They got what they bought. 153
The Mangan decision, particularly its unequivocal rejection of the
imposition of Section 5 liability based on such short selling activity, has
been followed by at least two other courts. 154
by the SEC starting in 2005. In most of these cases, the SEC’s primary basis for action has
been consistently predicated on the argument that short shares executed prior to the effective
date of a registration statement were effectively unregistered and non-exempt sales of
securities if the short positions where subsequently covered by the PIPE shares after the
registration statement was declared effective. See supra notes 138-151 and accompanying
text; infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
153. See Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Graham C. Mullen, United
States District Court Judge October 24, 2007, at 43-44, SEC v. Mangan (No. 3:06-CV-531);
see also SEC v. Mangan, 2007 WL 4102743 (W.D.N.C. 2007) (dismissing SEC’s Section 5
claim for “the reasons stated in open court during the hearing”).
154. SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); SEC v. Berlacher, 40 SEC. REG
& L. REP. (BNA) 149 (E.D. Pa. 2008). For example, in Lyon, during the period from 2001
to 2004, affiliates of hedge fund Gryphon Management Partners (collectively herein,
“Gryphon”) participated in approximately thirty-six (36) PIPE transactions. The SEC
brought an action in which it alleged that Gryphon (i) violated Section 5 of the 1933 Act;
(ii) committed securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act; and (iii)
committed insider trading in violation of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 529 F. Supp. 2d at
447.
The first charge brought against Gryphon was a violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act.
According to the SEC’s theory in this case, Gryphon unlawfully sold PIPE shares to the
public via a multi-step veiled process which effectively amounted to an unregistered threestep distribution as follows: first, Gryphon bought PIPE shares issued by publicly-traded
companies that were restricted from being sold in the open market; second, it sold short the
PIPE issuer’s public shares prior to the effective date of a resale registration statement for
the PIPE shares; and, finally, after the resale registration statements for the PIPE shares
became effective, Gryphon covered its short positions with the newly-registered PIPE
shares. Id. at 448.
The SEC contended that Gryphon’s process, particularly its hedging activity, violated
Section 5. As noted above, the heart of a Section 5 violation where a short sale is involved
generally involves the determination of what security was sold when a purchaser enters into
its short position. Here, the SEC contended that the unregistered PIPE shares shorted by
Gryphon in some of its PIPE transactions were actually sold when Gryphon entered into its
short position and thus Section 5 was violated through the public sale of unregistered shares.
Disagreeing with the Commission’s position, the court held that a short sale of a security
constitutes a sale of that security and, as such, how an investor subsequently chooses to
close the corresponding short position in her trading account does not alter the nature of that
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The SEC’s invocation of Section 5 in this factual context against
hedging PIPE investors increases the uncertainty inherent in PIPE
transactions and dissuades such investors from employing effective risk
management trading strategies. PIPE issuers are similarly impacted
because they may be compelled to compensate investors for this increased
regulatory risk and its attendant costs through higher discounts and other
contractual benefits. Hopefully, in light of recent judicial rejection of its
position, the SEC will revisit its enforcement policies as they pertain to the
application of Section 5 to short sales executed in connection with PIPE
transactions. 155
sale. As a corollary to this point, the court also noted that the SEC’s claims were void of
any allegations that the defendants’ actions prevented the short sale counterparties from
accessing or otherwise acquiring the type of information required by the 1933 Act. In
reaching this decision, the Court dismissed two telephone interpretations published by the
SEC staff, one of which the Court acknowledged was consistent with the SEC’s position in
the litigation but which the Court determined was conclusory and contained no analysis. Id.
at 454-59.
Thus, similar to the Mangan court, the court here rejected the SEC position and found that
“[b]ecause construing a short sale as a sale of the security that is eventually used to close
down the short position neither comports with the plain textual meaning of section 5 nor
advances the statute’s underlying purpose, the Court declines to apply that characterization
of a short sale to the transactions at issue in [the] litigation.” Id. at 455. In sum, the court
found the SEC’s argument “implausible” as well as unnecessary to achieve the critical
investor protection objectives underlying Section 5, and not compelled by SEC precedent.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the claims related to the violation of Section 5 of the 1933
Act. Id. at 459-60.
Similarly, in SEC v. Berlacher, the Commission’s attempt to hold a hedge fund manager and
several related parties liable for alleged violations of the Securities Act registration
requirements in connection with short sales involving several PIPE transactions was
rejected. As in the Lyon and Mangan cases previously discussed, the SEC here alleged that
Berlacher and several of his related funds (collectively, “Berlacher”) engaged in a
manipulative trading scheme that relied on short selling shares that were being issued in
certain PIPE transactions in which they participated. In particular, the SEC argued that after
entering into or otherwise becoming aware of a PIPE transaction, Berlacher would “short”
the issuer’s stock. Then, subsequent to the SEC’s declaration that the resale registration
statement was effective, Berlacher would use previously restricted PIPE shares to cover
their short positions—a course of action which is, in the SEC’s perspective, prohibited by
Section 5 of the 1933 Act. Reaching the same conclusion as that in Lyon and Mangan, the
court dismissed the Section 5 claims. 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 149 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
155. Another regulatory approach employed by the SEC in the PIPEs context has
manifested itself in the form of insider trading and securities fraud clams predicated on
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act that stem from certain contractual restrictions that are
frequently imposed on PIPE investors. In particular, PIPE securities offered by a subject
issuer are generally exempt from Section 5 registration because they are issued pursuant to
an exemption for nonpublic offerings such as Rule 506 of Regulation D. However, in order
to qualify for the exemption, PIPE issuers often require purchasers to represent that, among
other things, they do not have a present intention to distribute the PIPE securities they are
purchasing and will refrain from doing so during the pendency of the registration statement.
Based on these representations, the SEC has argued that short sales executed during the
interim period in which the registration statement is pending evidence an intention to
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distribute the securities that renders any contractual representations made by the PIPE
investors materially false and thus actionable under Section 10(b). For example, in the Lyon
case, the evidentiary record indicated that the foregoing representations were made by
Gryphon in each of the relevant PIPE purchase agreements. As such, pursuant to Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, the SEC alleged that Gryphon made materially false
representations to the PIPE issuers because Gryphon had, in fact, planned to distribute the
purchased PIPE securities to cover the short sales into which they would soon enter.
Gryphon maintained that such representations were not false because their short sales did
not constitute a “distribution,” as defined under the applicable securities laws, and thus they
had not misrepresented its investment intention. In the end, the Court sided with Gryphon
and accordingly dismissed the SEC’s Section 10(b) claims. See 529 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
Similar to claims of securities fraud predicated on Section 10(b), the SEC has also
increasingly relied on insider trading law as a basis for imposing liability on PIPE investors.
See cases cited in supra note 148. The SEC asserts that PIPE investors who engage in short
selling activity or otherwise transact in the shares of the PIPE issuer while in possession of
material non-public information about the underlying PIPE offering often do so in violation
of their contractual pledges to keep such information confidential. In this context, the SEC
is essentially relying on the “misappropriation theory” pursuant to which “a person commits
fraud ‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in
breach of a duty owed to the source of that information.” United States v. O’Hagan, 521
U.S. 642, 652 (1997). Based on various documents, including, the private placement
memoranda, purchase agreements, and other ancillary agreements, the SEC has claimed in
several cases that the PIPE investor defendants either directly or indirectly assumed a duty
of confidentiality that either expressly or constructively restricted their ability to trade on the
information conveyed. See cases cited in supra notes 117, 148.
For example, in the Lyon case, in addition to the Section 5 claims, the SEC also alleged that
Gryphon committed insider trading violations by shorting the publicly-traded securities of
PIPE issuers while in possession of material, non-public information about the
corresponding PIPE offerings and in violation of their contractual obligations to keep such
information confidential. In particular, the SEC argued that Gryphon entered into
confidentiality agreements or otherwise agreed to use the information provided by various
PIPE issuers solely for the purpose of evaluating the underlying PIPE transaction.
However, by trading on such information, according to the SEC, Gryphon misappropriated
the confidential information in breach of a duty owed to the issuer and therefore committed
insider trading in violation of Section 10(b). The court ruled that the SEC had stated a
plausible claim on this basis, thereby denying the motion to dismiss. See 529 F. Supp. 2d at
451-53. The other two cases discussed in the Section 5 context also declined to grant the
respective defendants’ motion to dismiss. See cases cited in supra note 150. First, the
Mangan court allowed the SEC to proceed with its insider trading allegations. See 2007 WL
4102743 (W.D.N.C. 2007). Similarly, while the Berlacher court actually dismissed the
SEC’s insider trading claims, it did so in a manner that permitted the SEC to replead its
claims with sufficient particularity on what information the defendants were required to
keep confidential. See 40 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 149 (E.D. Pa. 2008). See generally
Wang & Steinberg, supra note 148. Subsequently, the court in Mangan granted summary
judgment to the defendant, thereby dismissing the SEC’s insider traiding claim. 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 64814 (W.D.N.C. 2008).
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Until recently, the SEC declined to set forth a formal position focusing
on the applicability of Rule 415 in the context of PIPEs. Nonetheless,
during the Securities Act reform process, the SEC staff appeared to be
focusing on several characteristics of PIPE transactions in determining
whether the post-execution distribution of securities constituted a primary
offering. 156 The first issue was the size of the resale offering being
registered. In particular, the SEC staff was more likely to consider
offerings of shares representing more than 30% of the issuer’s public float
to be a primary offering. 157 The second issue that the SEC focused on was
indicia of control by the selling stockholders, including any board
representation or other contractual provisions enabling one to procure
control. In this context, the more control, the more likely the SEC was to
view the resale offering as a primary offering. 158
Recently, in response to questions from PIPE issuers, investors, and
practitioners, the SEC in 2007 clarified its position on resale registration
statements and noted that its basic threshold for determining whether a
resale registration is a primary offering is if the relevant registration
statement sought to register greater than one-third of the issuer’s pre-PIPE
public float. Additional factors the SEC considered included the number of
investors, the length of time the shares were held prior to registration, the
discount received by the investors, and the relationship of the selling
shareholders and the issuer. 159

156. Greenberg, Traurig, LLP, Real Time Legal, Regulatory & Tax Developments
Impacting Hedge Funds, Private Equity & Investments, PRIVATE FUNDS WEEKLY ROUNDUP,
(Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2007/0129.pdf. In a primary
offering, the proceeds (after expenses) are received directly by the company. By contrast, a
secondary offering is generally a registered offering whereby a substantial portion of the
proceeds of the offering go to the selling shareholders, not the issuing company. There is
significance attributable to this distinction. In particular, more stringent regulatory
requirements are often imposed on primary offerings. As such, there are potential
consequences that could arise from the characterization of a PIPE resale offering as a
primary offering rather than a secondary offering—a reality that is particularly important to
PIPE issuers and investors. These consequences include: (i) the inability to use Form S-3
unless the issuer is eligible to use Form S-3 for primary offerings; and (ii) the possibility
that selling stockholders would be considered statutory underwriters and as such, would be
exposed to “Section 11” underwriter liability for disclosure deficiencies contained in the
registration statement, and ineligible to use Rule 144 to resell any of the securities issued in
the private placement transactions.
157. Id. For purposes of the 30% public float test, the numerator includes all fullydiluted securities held by the selling stockholder (including any shares issuable upon
exercise of warrants or conversion of convertible securities, without regard to “blocker”
provisions), while the denominator only includes actual outstanding shares held by nonaffiliates.
158. Id.
159. See supra note 156 (inter alia, explaining the significance if an offering is viewed
as a primary offering).
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Form S-3 Amendments—Overview

Form S-3 is an abbreviated registration form available to domestic
companies that satisfy its requirements. Prior to the SEC’s recent
amendments, Form S-3 was generally only available to issuers in at the
market primary offerings of equity securities if, among other things, their
non-affiliate equity market capitalization (i.e., public float) was $75 million
or more. 160 The primary advantage of Form S-3 is that it allows eligible
companies to satisfy the disclosure requirements attendant to any registered
offering by way of automatic incorporation by reference from the periodic
reports the company is required to file pursuant to the Exchange Act. 161 As
such, Form S-3 provides issuing companies with a more versatile
registration option because it enables them to avoid much of the
preparation and other administrative costs that are typically associated with
an offering made pursuant to other forms, namely Form S-1.
The recent SEC changes to Form S-3 in some ways expand the
universe of eligible users. In particular, Form S-3, as amended, now
qualifies issuers that do not satisfy the $75 million public float requirement
for its use in at the market primary offerings of equity securities if certain
prerequisites are met. Specifically, according to the amended form, the
issuer is eligible to use Form S-3 in such situations if it (i) meets all of the
other registrant eligibility conditions traditionally applicable to the use of
Form S-3; (ii) has a class of common equity securities that is listed on a
national securities exchange; (iii) does not sell more than the equivalent of
one-third of its public float in primary offerings under Form S-3 over the
previous 12 calendar months; and (iv) is not a shell company and has not
been a shell company for at least twelve calendar months before the filing
of the registration statement. 162
In the final rule release announcing the Form S-3 amendments, the
Commission articulated several reasons for the changes adopted. First, the
SEC’s decision to amend Form S-3 is, in part, attributable to the
recommendations made by the Commission’s Advisory Committee on
Smaller Public Companies—a committee charged by the SEC in 2006 to
assess the current regulatory system for smaller companies under U.S.
securities laws. In particular, the Advisory Committee recommended, inter
alia, that the SEC permit all reporting companies with securities listed on a
national securities exchange or NASDAQ, or quoted on the Over-theCounter Bulletin Board electronic quotation service, to be eligible to use
160. See General Instruction I.B.1 of Form S-3; see also S-3 Amendment Release, supra
note 30, at 13 (discussing Form S-3’s history and contemporary applications).
161. Id. See generally Barbara Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets and
Shelf Regulation -- An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135 (1984).
162. SEC Amendment Release, supra note 30.
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Form S-3 if they have been subject to the Exchange Act's reporting
requirements for at least one year and are current in their periodic reporting
at the time of the filing. 163 While the SEC’s ultimate amendments did not
represent a wholesale adoption of the Advisory Committee’s
recommendations, some of them are nonetheless reflected in the new rule.
An additional reason advanced by the SEC for the amendments of Form S3 is the SEC’s belief that the extension of Form S-3 to additional issuers
should expand these issuers’ access to the public securities markets and
overall participation in capital formation transactions. 164 In this regard, the
SEC noted that “[t]he shelf eligibility resulting from Form S-3 eligibility
and the ability to forward incorporate information on Form S-3, therefore,
allow companies to avoid traditional delays and interruptions in the
offering process and can reduce or even eliminate the costs associated with
preparing and filing post-effective amendments to the registration
statement.” 165 The SEC also cited the significant advances in the electronic
dissemination and availability of issuer disclosure transmitted by means of
the Internet during the last several years as an additional justification for
the expansion of Form S-3 eligible users. 166
3.

Form S-3 Amendments—Critique

The SEC’s recent amendments of Form S-3 may have a profound
impact on the PIPE market for several key reasons. First, in a move
contrary to the recommendations of its Advisory Committee, 167 the SEC’s
amendments extend access to Form S-3 to only companies that either (i)
satisfy the traditional Form S-3 requirements (primarily the $75 million
dollar float), or alternatively (ii) satisfy the new conditions articulated by
the recent form changes. 168 However, while these changes benefit the PIPE
market to a certain extent, some aspects of the SEC’s changes may present
formidable impediments to a PIPE issuer’s ability to use Form S-3—a more
advantageous option for the public registration component of PIPE
163. Recommendation IV.P.3. of the Final Report of the Advisory Committee on
Smaller Public Companies (Apr. 23, 2006), at 68-72, available at
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf.
164. S-3 Amendment Release, supra note 30, at 7.
165. Id. at 6-7.
166. In particular, the SEC’s position on this factor, as articulated in the final rule release
provides that “[t]he pervasiveness of the Internet in daily life and the advent of EDGAR as a
central repository of company filings have combined to allow widespread, direct, and
contemporaneous accessibility to company disclosure at little or no cost to those interested
in obtaining the information. For this, we think it is appropriate to once again expand the
class of companies who may register primary offerings on Form S-3 in a limited manner.”
Id. at 6-8.
167. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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transactions.
One of these new conditions is the requirement that an issuer (not
meeting the traditional public float requirements) be listed on a national
securities exchange. 169 As such, while the rule will provide a benefit to
many PIPE stock exchange listed issuers that were not previously eligible
to use Form S-3 in connection with the registration of PIPE shares, these
changes also simultaneously exclude a significant number of companies
that would have been able, pursuant to the Advisory Committee’s
recommendations, to utilize Form S-3 to issue shares in registered direct
offerings and to thereby maximize the benefit of smaller discounts that this
alternative to the traditional PIPE structure affords. The SEC’s rationale
for conditioning eligibility under the new Form S-3 rules to issuers having
a class of common equity securities that are listed on a national securities
exchange is rooted in the Commission’s primary directive—the furtherance
of investor protection. 170
Particularly, the SEC believes that the following factors associated
with listing on a national securities exchange will combine to ensure that
the expansion of Form S-3 eligibility that will be precipitated by the recent
amendments does not create room for abuse and therefore, the erosion of
investor protection in the PIPE sector of the investment community. In the
final rule release, the SEC articulated its position that the following
“common attributes allow the exchanges to sustain efficient and liquid
markets that should help monitor the expansion of shelf registration
eligibility on Form S-3 and help mitigate any attendant risks posed by
expansion.” 171 The common attributes are:
• “[T]he exchanges’ listing rules and procedures, as well as
other requirements, provide an additional measure of
protection for investors. Exchanges have both quantitative
and qualitative listing rules that are designed to evidence that
their listed issuers meet specified minimum requirements
169. A “national securities exchange” is a securities exchange that has registered with
the Commission under Section 6 of the Exchange Act. There are currently ten securities
exchanges registered under Section 6(a) of the Exchange Act as national securities
exchanges. These are the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange,
NASDAQ, the Boston Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the Chicago
Stock Exchange, the International Securities Exchange, the National Stock Exchange
(formerly the Cincinnati Stock Exchange), NYSE Arca (formerly the Pacific Exchange),
and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. In addition, an exchange that lists or trades security
futures products (as defined in Section 3(a)(56) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78c(56)])
may register as a national securities exchange under Section 6(g) of the Exchange Act solely
for the purpose of trading security futures products. For purposes of new General
Instruction I.B.6., however, only exchanges registered under Section 6(a) of the Exchange
Act will be deemed to be “national securities exchanges.”
170. See supra note 30, at 19-23.
171. Id. at 22.
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when the issuer first lists on the exchange and thereafter.” 172
“Initial listing standards serve as a means for an exchange to
screen issuers and to provide listed status to issuers with
sufficient public float, investor base, and trading interest to
assure that the market for the issuer’s security has the depth
and liquidity necessary to maintain fair and orderly
markets;” 173
“Maintenance listing criteria help assure that the issuer
continues to meet the exchange’s standards for depth and
liquidity;” 174 and
“Exchange-listed securities also are subject to real-time
reporting of quotation and transaction information, which
benefits investors by apprising them of current market
information about the security.” 175

Nonetheless, the SEC’s 2007 amendments expanding the scope of the
Form S-3 contradicts the Commission’s principal rationale for the Form’s
adoption. In promulgating the Form S-3 in 1982, the SEC “relie[d] on the
efficient market theory, allow[ing] a maximum use of incorporation of
Exchange Act reports and requir[ing] the least disclosure to be presented in
the prospectus and delivered to investors.” 176 As then adopted, the Form S172. Id. at 21. For example, while exchange listing standards can vary from exchange to
exchange, they generally uniformly require listed issuers to (i) meet certain standards
relating to the number of public shareholders and shares outstanding, shareholder approval
of specified matters, and in certain cases, earnings or income; and (ii) meet specified
corporate governance standards, including the requirement that certain committees of the
issuer’s board be composed solely of independent directors. In contrast, automated interdealer quotation systems such as the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board and Pink Sheets do
not provide companies with the ability to list their securities, but, rather, serve as a medium
for the over-the-counter securities market by collecting and distributing market maker
quotes to subscribers. As such, these automated inter-dealer quotation systems do not
maintain or impose listing standards, nor do they have a listing agreement or arrangement
with the companies whose securities are quoted through them.
173. Id. at 21.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383,
Exchange Act Release No. 18524, 1982 WL 90370 (Mar. 3,1982). The U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that the fraud-onthe-market theory creates a rebuttable presumption of reliance
in Exchange Act Section 10(b) securities litigation. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 225 (1988) (holding that the presumption “relieves the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff of an
unrealistic evidentiary burden, and is consistent with, and supportive of, the Act's policy of
requiring full disclosure and fostering reliance on market integrity.”). See generally MARC
I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 7.05 (2008); Donald C.
Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992) (arguing that, while theoretical in construct, the
fraud-on-the-market theory is extremely practical in its application); Jonathan R. Macey,
The Fraud on the Market Theory: Some Preliminary Issues, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 923
(1989) (“After Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the issue of whether a particular stock traded in an
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3 could be used in primary at the market offerings of common stock only if
the subject issuer had filed its Exchange Act reports for at least a 36-month
period and had a public float of $150 million (or alternatively a public float
of $100 million and three million share trading volume on an annual
basis). 177 In 1992, still adhering to the efficient market rationale, the
Commission lowered the Form S-3 for issuers having such equity offerings
to a 12-month reporting history and $75 million public float. 178
The U.S. Supreme Court has given its approbation to the efficient
market theory in the securities litigation context. 179 In ascertaining whether
a subject security trades in an efficient market, lower courts view Form S-3
eligibility as a key criterion. 180 Given this history underlying the Form S3’s adoption and implementation, the SEC’s expansion of Form S-3 to
encompass issuers that may not be traded in an efficient market is a
significant departure. Indeed, the Commission’s 2007 amendments may be
viewed as an effort to facilitate capital raising while implicitly rationalizing
that any security listed on a national securities exchange is, by definition,

efficient market will now become an important part of every fraud on the market case.”);
William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 341 (1986) (questioning traditional assumption that market can efficiently price
securities).
177. Securities Act Release No. 6383 (1982).
178. Securities Act Release No. 6964 (1992). This rule change allowed approximately
450 additional issuers to use the Form S-3 for such equity offerings. Id.
179. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The Supreme Court stated:
The presumption [of reliance] is . . . . supported by common sense and
probability. Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise
that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all
publicly available information, and hence, any material misrepresentations. It
has been noted that “it is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who
does not rely on market integrity. Who would knowingly roll the dice in a
crooked crap game?” Indeed, nearly every court that has considered the
proposition has concluded that where materially misleading statements have
been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the
reliance of individual plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be
presumed. Commentators generally have applauded the adoption of one
variation or another of the fraud-on-the-market theory. An investor who buys
or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of
that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in market
price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations,
therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.
Id. at 246-47.
180. See, e.g., Freeman v. Laventhol and Horwath, 915 F.3d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1995)
(eligibility to use Form S-3 key factor); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1275-87
(D.N.J. 1989) (stating that companies entitled to use SEC Form S-3 would almost by
definition encompass stocks traded in a “special developed market”); Harman v.
Lymphomed, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 522, 525 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating that Form S-3 status is
perhaps the “most significant” factor that the market for the stock was efficient).
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traded in an efficient market. This rationalization, however, contravenes
established doctrine that the critical inquiry is the market for that particular
stock, not the location where such stock trades. 181
On the other hand, from a capital raising perspective, by limiting the
availability of the Form S-3 under the newly promulgated rules to
companies that are listed on a national securities exchange, the SEC may
impede the ability of an appreciable number of OTC companies to avail
themselves of the transactional benefits inherent in the PIPE capital
financing paradigm. As a result, the PIPE market may not be able to derive
the benefits generated by other recent SEC regulatory changes. For
example, as discussed above, the SEC in 2007 adopted amendments to
Rule 144 in a move that will provide an added level of liquidity to PIPE
investors by making their shares (of an Exchange Act reporting issuer)
freely tradable, irrespective of registration, after a newly abbreviated
holding period of six months rather than a year. 182 This change, and most
importantly, the level of liquidity it infuses was expected to increase both
issuer and investor appetites for PIPEs and accordingly the overall level of
PIPE transactions. However, the SEC’s decision to exclude OTC
companies from Form S-3 eligibility, hence increasing the costs of such
public offerings, may adversely impact the number of PIPE transactions.
Another key consideration regarding the SEC’s recent Form S-3
changes is the public float cap that is placed on the use of Form S-3.
According to the new rule, issuers are permitted to use Form S-3 for the
registration of securities that do not exceed one-third of the company’s
public float. 183 Although the SEC’s final cap of one-third of the public
float is larger than the cap that was originally proposed, 184 it places a firm
limitation on the optimization of the PIPE market by restraining the size of
181. Harman, 122 F.R.D. at 525. See In re Polymedica Corp. Securities Litigation, 432
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); In re Xcelera.com Securities Litigation, 430 F.3d 503 (1st Cir. 2005);
Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005); infra note 185; see also Oscar
Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269-70 (5th Cir.
2007) (holding that plaintiffs must “demonstrate loss causation before triggering the
presumption of reliance” and that “loss causation must be established at the class
certification stage by a preponderance of all admissible evidence”).
182. See supra notes 119-135 and accompanying text.
183. As discussed in the final rule release, it is important to note that the one-third cap
imposed by the new General Instruction I.B.6. to Form S-3 is only applicable to offerings
conducted pursuant to Form S-3. As such, an issuer that is prevented from utilizing Form S3 due to the new volume limitation, is not precluded from registering a primary offering of
securities on Form S-1 or executing private placements. However, an issuer that is forced to
take this route will lose the efficiency benefits that are often attributable to offerings
conducted pursuant to Form S-3.
184. As proposed, new General Instruction I.B.6. of Form S-3 would have limited the
amount of securities eligible companies could sell in accordance with its provision to no
more than the equivalent of 20% of their public float over any period of twelve calendar
months.
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PIPE transactions that can be executed pursuant to Form S-3 registration.
According to the SEC, “raising the cap to one-third of public float will
allow an offering that is large enough to help an issuer raise a relatively
significant amount of capital when market opportunities rise, but still small
enough for the SEC to moderate the expansion of shelf eligibility with
appropriate attention to the protection for investors, including the effect
such new issuance may have on the market for a thinly traded security.” 185
Additionally, while the SEC believes that the volume limitation still will
facilitate the promotion of capital formation (particularly for smaller
companies) in a manner consistent with the furtherance of investor
protection, its adoption of the amendments does not foreclose the
possibility that it may revisit the appropriateness of the one-third cap in the
future. 186
A major problem with the SEC’s one-third volume requirement is that,
in practice, it may be illusory. Under the 2007 amendments, an issuer must
be listed on a national securities exchange in order to utilize Form S-3. As
such, these issuers may be subject to abide by volume requirements
mandated by the applicable exchange that in some situations may be more
stringent that the SEC’s one-third rule. For example, companies that are
listed on the Nasdaq Stock Exchange are subject to its listing rules and
requirements. One such requirement is Nasdaq Rule 4350(i)(D) (the “20
Percent Rule”) pursuant to which a company cannot issue voting securities
such as common stock, convertible preferred stock, or convertible debt and
warrants in a private transaction, at a price less than the greater of book
value or market value, constituting in the aggregate 20 percent or more of
its common or voting power outstanding prior to such issuance. 187
Therefore, by allowing only companies that are traded on national
exchanges (such as the Nasdaq) to invoke the revised Form S-3 rules, the
Commission, in practical effect, ensures that an enterprise seeking to issue
185. See S-3 Amendment Release, supra note 30, at 18. The SEC’s reference to “a
thinly traded security” is an admission that any such security does not trade in an efficient
market. Allowing such issuers to use Form S-3 for primary offerings of common stock is a
significant departure from prior practice. See also Harman, 122 F.R.D. at 525 n.1 (stating
that “[t]he SEC’s explicit rationale for this [disclosure] system is that information on
companies which file an S-3 form is widely available in the market, and therefore need not
be disseminated in the prospectus”); supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
186. See S-3 Amendment Release, supra note 30, at 18.
187. See
NASDAQ,
Inc.,
Manual
§4320(i)(D)
(2008),
available
at
http://wallstreet.cch.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F
1%5F4%5F1&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequityrules%2F.
Notwithstanding the prohibition contained in NASDAQ rule 4320(i)(D), “NASDAQ may
make exceptions to the requirement when the delay in securing stockholder approval would
seriously jeopardize the financial viability of the enterprise and reliance by the company on
this exception is expressly approved by the Audit Committee or a comparable body of the
Board of Directors.” Id. at IM-4340(a), n.1; see also Gormley, supra note 15, at 23.
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the one-third maximum of its public float (at less than the greater of market
or book value) will be impeded unless it procures shareholder approval. 188
V.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion confirms that the PIPE financing alternative
has evolved into a versatile capital formation mechanism. In current
market conditions, as the process of capital formation continues to undergo
significant transformation, subject companies are now, more than ever,
reluctant to incur the costs that are becoming increasingly associated with
traditional capital formation options, like the registered offering or certain
types of exempt offerings. 189 As such, PIPEs stand to serve as a flexible
financing mechanism for issuers and an attractive investment alternative for
investors.
In fact, the PIPE as a financing structural alternative is becoming a
mainstay in the investment community, and several factors have combined
to make this possible. First, as discussed in the introduction of this article,
current market conditions have created an investment environment that has
constricted traditional sources of capital. The credit market, in particular,
has stalled and as a result, the traditional capital wells of private equity and
bank debt also have faltered. Similarly, recent regulatory developments,
including the amendments to Rule 144, have created an investment
paradigm with the potential to optimize the value of PIPEs to issuers and
investors.
Yet, while the foregoing paints an optimistic picture for PIPEs, this
optimism is tempered by other developments that give rise for analysis. In
particular, as PIPEs gained recognition, the SEC’s regulation of PIPEs has
correspondingly heightened. As a result of this amplified regulatory
scrutiny, the value inherent in PIPEs may be constrained and thus not fully
optimized. However, on balance, the stage has been set and PIPEs will
likely remain a major player in the arena of capital formation alternatives.
In summary, the pipeline is flowing—PIPEs continue to offer suitable
issuers the opportunity to raise capital efficiently while providing investors
with a versatile investment tool that seeks to maximize financial returns.

188. See Max Fumes, SEC Shortens, Grandfathers Rule 144 Holding Periods, The PIPEs
Report, vol. V, No. 22 (December 18, 2007) (noting that “a company trying to issue 33% of
its float may bump up against the Nasdaq limitation, and vice versa. But given the Nasdaq’s
built-in ceiling, securities experts wonder why the SEC is imposing a cap at all.”).
189. The Regulation A, intrastate public, and Rule 506 (to non-accredited investors)
exemptions are examples. Extensive costs are incurred and government regulation prevails
in such offerings. See Steven Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the Securities Act of
1933: An Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591 (1996) (describing the various exemptions
to registration and their associated costs).

